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ABSTRACT
The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 introduced definitions of terrorist activity,
terrorist group and terrorist offences for the first time. These definitions, enacted subsequent
to the Good Friday Agreement (1998), were examined to ascertain whether perspectives of
crime control or risk influenced their formulation. Evidence of control perspectives were
elicited within the definitions but themes of risk or actuarial justice were not found. The
policy analysis established that the definitions which emerged through process of coerced
policy convergence emanating from the Council of the European Union with Irish legislators
having limited influence.
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CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Research Rationale and Aims

The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 introduced legal definitions for a terrorist
group, terrorist offences and terrorist activity for the first time in our turbulent history. The
Act implemented Ireland‘s obligations under the Framework Decision on Combatting
Terrorism (2002) and three terrorist related conventions. Part 2 of the Act gives effect to the
Framework Decision obliging Member States to incorporate agreed definitions and create
specific offences within their criminal law.
To facilitate such a study, a policy review was conducted to understand the influences and
processes which culminated in this Act. To facilitate such a study tools of policy analysis
and policy convergence were chosen.

The policy analysis was informed by Irish and

European Union legislative documents, Oireachtas debates, the Department of Justice and
Equality, specialist committees and commissions as well as advocacy groups.

The

documentary analysis reviewed the content relevance before thematic trends were elicited.
The literature review examined whether theoretical perspectives on crime control and/or risk
are reflected in the definitions formulated. The thesis assessed whether these terrorist
definitions reflect aspects of a crime control model described by Packer (1968) or the
Garland‘s crime complex (2001). Paradigms of risk and actuarial justice were considered to
assess their potential influence upon the decision to introduce terrorist definitions.
1.2

Findings

The problem of terrorism was identified by the European Parliament before September 11,
2001. After that date, policy making moved rapidly in the Council of the European Union to
the virtual exclusion of the Oireachtas and public debate. The principle definitions in Part 2,
agreed by the framework decision, were politically binding on Ireland. The global nature of
terrorism contributed to such political dynamism.

Terrorist definitions do reveal crime

control objectives whereby the prosecutorial path is eased by evidential presumptions and all
encapsulating definitions but do not extend to the evolution of a crime complex. Risk
strategies seeking to control dangerous groups were not evident in the definitions but policies
aimed at containing funding and support for terrorist groups did reveal such purpose. The
9

thesis did not reveal any support for the proposition that actuarial justice policies underlie the
terrorist definitions created.
1.3

Thesis Layout

This thesis will begin by exploring the theoretical foundations to perspectives on crime
control, risk and policy making within the literature chapter before describing the
methodology adopted. The findings chapter will summarise evidence elicited from the data
sources which is the subject of analysis in the chapter entitled discussion of findings. Finally,
the conclusion chapter summarises the lessons to be drawn from the research.

10

CHAPTER 2
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 for the first time in our turbulent history
defined a terrorist group and terrorist offence. The definitions introduced in Part 2 of the Act
were examined to assess whether their formulation signifies a movement towards a crime
control perspective and/or represents the emergence of risk technologies in criminal justice
policy making. The study also considered whether the definitions demonstrate a movement
on the pendulum of risk towards the actuarial end of that scale. Before evidence of crime
control traits can be identified within the relevant definitions, an understanding is required of
the theoretical perspectives on crime control. The literature review examined the crime
control model first described by Packer (1968) and Garland‘s writings about the emergence
of a ‗crime complex‘ (2001). In addition, the theories underpinning the promotion of risk
techniques in criminal Justice, known as the new penology (Simon and Feeley: 1992) and
actuarial justice, were considered.
To understand the derivation of these definitions, a policy review will examine the processes,
persons and institutions that refined definitions within the Criminal Justice (Terrorist
Offences) Act 2005 so as to inform the theoretical conclusions. As global terrorism operates
without borders, terrorism has demanded the attention of European Union policy makers and
facilitated recent definitional changes in Ireland. Consequently, theories and frameworks
which assist in the analysis of policy making processes, policy transfer and convergence are
reviewed as part of the literature review to enable the policy analysis to capture the impact of
those processes upon the development of our anti-terrorist policy. An evaluation of whether
ideological shifts have occurred necessitates examination of pre-existing terrorist legislation
as well as the cultural and political impact of terrorism in our history. However, to appreciate
why anti-terrorism policies might exhibit control and risk management traits necessitates an
understanding of the impact of terrorism upon criminal justice systems.
2.1

Terrorism Undermines Criminal Justice Systems

Anti-terrorism policies position due process rights and crime control objectives in direct
conflict. Michael Levi (2007) identifies the ‗tasks‘ required to sustain terrorism as being to:
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‘Neutralise law enforcement by technical skill, by corruption, and/or by legal
arbitrage, using legal obstacles to enforcement operations and prosecutions which vary
between states’
Therefore, terrorism presents a stiff challenge to criminal justice policy makers who
historically have been unsuccessful in suppressing terrorist groups. Duggan et al (2005)
examined policies employed in Northern Ireland to control terrorism. She later concluded
that ‗four of the other five interventions suggest more of a deviant effect, leading to an
escalation of terrorism activity’ and advised against reliance on deterrent strategies against
terrorism (Dugan: 2009). Equally, Cronin (2006) found in his study that only two deterrence
based strategies, amongst eight contributing factors, led to the demise of a terrorist group.
Consequently, deterrent strategies alone appear unsuccessful in curbing terrorism which
prompts an examination of whether Ireland has moved away from those unsuccessful
deterrent based strategies to curb terrorist threats. Deterrent policies are founded upon the
assumption of the rational being who can be deterred. However, actuarial justice involves
strategies that assume the offender not to be rational. Therefore, to enable an assessment of
whether the definitions in Part 2 of the Act are speaking to a rational actor requires firstly an
understanding of perspectives on risk and crime control.
2.2

Theories of Control

Packer (1968) described two basic models of criminal process; the ‗due process‘ and the
‗crime control‘ models.

The ‗crime control‘ model emphasises crime containment

resembling ‗an assembly line conveyor belt down which moves an endless stream of cases’
(Packer 1968:158). Packer described the ‗crime control‘ model as favouring the screening of
potential offenders, resembling a risk-reduction approach to criminal justice. This contrasts
with the ‗due process‘ model protecting individual rights from the excesses of State power.
King (1981) surmised that the ‗crime control‘ model proceeds on a presumption of guilt.
Practical representations include the prioritising of the victim over the accused and the
removal of evidential and system controls within the criminal justice process to ease the path
to a successful prosecution. The use of inference provisions and evidential presumptions
overcomes system barriers to establishing guilt (Campbell: 2007). Packer‘s theory mainly
addresses the trial process but Campbell (2007) argues it has equal application to sentencing,
in particular mandatory sentencing.
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Garland (2001) expanded upon this control terminology in a more contemporary context. He
believed there had been movement towards a crime control model precipitated by the State
declining to accept responsibility for rehabilitation of the individual offender, otherwise
known as ‗penal welfarism‘. Garland (2001) believed cultural changes within society were
responsible for this change which he collectively called the ‗crime complex‘. They included
the public acknowledgment that governments cannot control crime, an acceptance of high
crime rates and a cultural fear of crime. Emerging from these cultural changes are reactive
policies designed to demonstrate persisting control, a phenomenon which some
commentators have called ‗governing through crime’ (Simon: 2007). This politicisation
requires regular symbolic signals of control. The status of the victims is elevated within the
collective consciousness and incapacitation emerges as the primary sentencing objective,
especially for repetitive and dangerous criminals (Garland: 2001). Garland cautioned that a
criminology of the ‗dangerous other‘ was emerging from this crime complex (2001:167).
Theoretical enquiries into strategies employed to manage risks posed by ‗others‘,
marginalised within society, began with Simon and Feeley (1992). Their theory, known as
the ‗new penology‘, was based upon policies believed to be directed at a perceived social
underclass in the United States. Their theory may however have relevance to terrorist groups
who present as ungovernable.
2.3

Paradigms of Risk

The concept of the ‗dangerous other‘ was recently explored by De Londras who observed
that Al Qaeda terrorists were perceived as a more dangerous threat thus posing a greater
challenge to anti-terrorism policy makers (2011: 14). As discussed above, Feeley and Simon
(1992) called this trend of managing risky groups as the ‗new penology‘. This approach
isolates and separates the dangerous from ‗normal‘ citizens using alternative criminal justice
policies to control such groups (Feeley and Simon 1992). These policies have been described
as having ‗managerial, not transformative’ purpose concerned only with ‗surveillance,
confinement and control‘ (Gordon 1991).

Individuals categorised into such groups are

selectively chosen for these different control strategies based on risk profiles (Feeley and
Simon 1992). The emergence of this risk management approach to criminal justice was
described by Cohen (1985) as the new ‗master plan‘. O‘Malley noted that these policies are
less concerned with causation (1996) whilst Zedner (2007) describes this new era as the ‗precrime‘ society.

In this new epoch, traditional objectives of prosecuting, punishing or

13

rehabilitating offenders are absent.

Therefore, measurement of success involves the

‗decoupling of performance evaluation from external social objectives’ (Heydebrand and
Seron 1990). O‘Malley warned that the trajectory of such policies:
‘signalled not merely a redirection of particular policies but rather a shift away from
the disciplinary technology of power itself’ (1996).
Interestingly, O‘Malley (2004) further deconstructed Simon and Feeley‘s theories by
emphasising the distinction to be drawn between risk-based technologies and actuarial
justice.

O‘Malley describes actuarial justice as an offshoot of risk technologies that

emphasises ‗system focused efficiencies‘ which:
‘reduce the interventions of justice to merely incapacitating techniques that merely
displace punitive, reintegrative, correctional and deterrent strategies’ (2004:31)
Whereas risk-based situational crime prevention methods seek to deter, actuarial justice seeks
to incapacitate. Deterrence strategies fail to achieve engagement of the marginalised ‗others‘
who remain permanently isolated from ‗normal‘ society. O‘Malley believes that whereas
‗risk technologies‘ assume a rational actor, ‗actuarial justice‘ is the more appropriate term
where the offender is perceived as ‗irredeemable, irremediable and dangerous ‘other’(2004).
Examples of actuarial policies include formula based sentencing provisions replacing
individualised sentences, curfews, civil detention orders and post-release reporting
obligations (O‘Malley: 2004). O‘Malley (2009:32) believes the creation of ‗others‘, who
exists outside normal society, is a political construct. Therefore, the potential transposition of
actuarial justice polices should be examined within the political, social and cultural
environment into which it is alleged they have been transposed.
Complementing these approaches to risk, Beck (1992, 1997), a critical criminologist,
described the emergence of a ‗risk society‘ within industrialised countries who operate
globalised economies. These societies are resultantly exposed to incalculable risks with
limited ability to manage risks locally. He argued that this has led to increased ‗social and
political dynamism' (1992:12) transcending traditional forms of risk management. Beck
(1992) cautioned that although risks are dominant and divisive features in society they should
not dominate government policy as they are not statistically predictable. De Londras (2011)
applied Becks ‗risk society‘ to terrorism, acknowledging its awkward fit, but believing such a
framework was useful within which to assess terrorist policies (2011:17). In particular, she
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identified the impact of globalisation upon open societies as being particularly relevant to
terrorism. Terrorism operates without borders, does not respond to international law and
cannot be contained by conventional diplomatic means, requiring the political dynamism
referred to by Beck (1997). De Londras (2011) argues that these factors contribute to the
categorisation of terrorists as ‗others‘ (2011:17).

Echoing Garland (2001), De Londras

asserts that this construct of ‗otherness‘ is a response to the rise of victimhood within society
bringing as it does the ‗risk‘ of victimhood (2011).
However, both Garland (2001) and Simon and Feeley (1996) developed their theories upon
the observation of cultural and political developments in the USA. Beck spoke generally
about the creation of risks in a globalised world whilst O‘Malley (2004) cautioned that the
persuasiveness of risk theories depended upon the cultural and political environment into
which they were transposed.

Therefore, analysis of the relevance of these theoretical

perspectives within an Irish context is necessary.
2.4

Irish Perspectives on Crime Control and Risk

The ‗troubles‘ dominated policy making within the Department of Justice from 1972 (Walsh
1998). The violence threatened not just lives but the political fabric of the Irish State. This
was highlighted by Farrell (1986:149) who said ‘it is impossible to calculate the destabilising
effects [on the political system] of an issue….which has absorbed so much government time
and energy‘. The violence continued for many decades such that Downes and Morgan
(2004) observed that ‗comparatively speaking, the death toll in Northern Ireland alone made
the UK absolutely the most violent liberal democracy’. In evaluating contemporary antiterrorist policies this history cannot be ignored. Hood (1987:530) cautioned that criminal
justice policy:
‗can….only be fully understood in this wider context-and with due respect to an
historical understanding of the relationship between perceptions of crime and the
various strategies that have been employed in the attempts to control it’.
In that context, Kilcommins et al (2004) applied the six indices of Garlands‘ crime complex
to Ireland and concluded that penal–welfarism ‗never existed in developed form in Ireland’.
Despite our subversive history, Kilcommins et al (2004) found that the Irish do not have a
‗cultural‘ fear of crime and law making in Ireland does not constitute ‗retaliatory gestures‘ as
described by Garland (2001). The primacy of incapacitation did not appear evident in
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Ireland. It is noteworthy that whilst Kilcommins et al (2004) acknowledged the emerging role
of victims‘ they did not believe victims‘ voices directed criminal justice policy (2004:289).
More recently, however, Mulcahy (2006) noted that ‗signal events‘ may create a sense of
collective victimhood. In relation to our criminal process, Kilcommins et al (2004) cautioned
that the evolution of ‗extraordinary‘ powers utilised for ‗ordinary‘ crime was silently
changing the direction of Irish criminal justice towards ‗something like a crime complex’
(2004:291), a process described as ‗repression by stealth’. They arrived at this position upon
consideration of the perceived erosion of procedural safeguards within the criminal process,
many having been introduced during heightened terrorist activity in Ireland. Ironically, this
concern about the normalisation of extraordinary powers is not new. Hillyard (1971)
commented, in the Northern Irish context, that the ‗temporary‘ label on extraordinary powers
‗belied their longevity’.
More recently, Campbell (2006) examined the Irish criminal justice process, from
investigation to sentencing, using Garland‘s model of control and warned of a ‗growth in the
culture of control’.

Similarly, Kilcommins and Vaughan (2006) revised their earlier

observations as to the relevance of Garlands‘ crime complex indices to Ireland noting that:
‘traces of a more punitive ‘logics of action’- embracing many of Garland’s crime
control indices – are also evident in Ireland’
Interestingly, they observed that whenever Ireland is faced with a security crisis ‗coercive
laws‘ are designed as the solution. They argued that this process is facilitated by our terrorist
past which has created a ‗collective unconscious‘ of the ‗dangerous‘ (2004:179).

The

possible penetration of risk and actuarial justice strategies into our criminal justice process
was touched upon by Campbell (2006) who observed some movement towards a crime
control model with aspects of ‗actuarial‘ policies.

Campbell subsequently examined

organised crime legislation within the new penology framework and commented that:
‗actuarial probabilistic language of risk is joined to the moral language of blame’
(Campbell: 2007).
Thus far, there has not been an analysis of the definitional changes introduced in the Criminal
Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 within control or risk constructs. Campbell‘s (2007)
examination of legislation introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2007 to counter organised
crime threats within crime control perspective is however interesting as the definition of
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‗terrorist group‘ is similar to ‗criminal organisation‘ under that Act (Campbell: 2007). The
European Commission proposal for the framework decision on terrorism (2001:8) confirms
that the proposed definition of ‗terrorist group‘ was based upon the definition of ‗criminal
organisation‘ adopted by the Council of the European Union and later transposed into Irish
legislation.

Equally, Conway and Mulqueen (2009) observed that gangland crime is

increasingly perceived as a ‗threat to state security, such that there is an increasing overlap
between crime and security, without examining the theoretical basis for this trend’.
Consequently, they suggest in the context of organised crime that the politicisation of crime
is progressively influencing criminal justice policy ‗away from a rights based
regime’(Conway and Mulqueen:2009).
Interestingly, Kilcommins et al (2004) believed that the absence of administrative structures
necessary to move a ‗crime control‘ agenda forward had protected Ireland from increased
punishment. However, given that the terrorist related definitions found in Part 2 of the Act
have their genesis in a European Union initiative, it is not clear whether those barriers
preventing movement towards a crime control perspective remain.

Huysmans (2000)

cautioned that at European Union level social problems, such as migration, are increasingly
presented with emphasis on potential threats posed to citizens such that ‗social relations‘ are
organised into ‗security relations‘. This was echoed by Loader (2009:600) who cautioned
that ‗security discourses are coming more to the forefront of European politics’:

For

example, article 29 of the Treaty of the European Union (1992) states that the union aims to
‗provide citizens with a high level of safety. Framework decisions agreed by the Council of
Ministers have depoliticised the European Union legislative procedure away from the
Parliament with resultant exclusion of meaningful public discussion (Balzaq: 2008). The role
of national parliaments and democratic processes are bypassed (Loader: 2009). Irish analyses
of control theories or risk based strategies have however failed to combine theoretical
reviews with analyses of the underlying policy making processes in Ireland and Europe.
Consequently, to facilitate a greater understanding of the origins of any theoretical shifts
within anti-terrorist policies this study examined the policy process within which the
definitions were formulated. The first task was to identify the tools of policy analysis.
2.5

The Policy Process

Jones and Newburn (2002:179) observed that ‗we still know very little about how penal
policy comes to be the way it is‘. They attributed this deficit of knowledge to the dearth of
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empirical research studies focusing on the policy making process. Similarly, Ismaeli (2006)
commented that the:
‗messiness of real-world decision-making remains largely unknown…… understanding
the policy making environment in all of its complexity becomes more central to the
enterprise of criminology’.
To understand these processes requires knowledge of models of policy analysis. The policy
model rarely, if ever, resembles a logical path towards a solution.

Kingdon (1995)

recognised that policy making should involve steps including ‗agenda setting, alternative –
specification, authoritative choice and implementation‘. However, Kingdon, like Nelson
(1996) agreed that policy making seldom conforms to this ‗policy cycle’. A rigid policy cycle
cannot ‗capture value difference, the role of interest groups, shifts in public moods, and
institutional constraints‘ within the policy making environment (Ismaeli: 2006). Neither
would it incorporate the life experiences, political interests or biases of policy makers who
direct policy choices (Ismaeli: 2006). Ismaeli (2006) advises policy researchers to adopt ‘the
principle of contextuality‘, summarised by Laswell (1936) as ‗who gets what, when, how‘.
Research within this ‗contextual framework‘ must first identify the environment, secondly
arrange that environment into a ‗policy making community‘ and thereafter reveal networks or
relationships that influence policy development. Ismaeli (2006) recommends understanding
the ecological development of policy whereby knowledge of the habitat, the
interdependencies and dominance of groups within the community so as to reveal the policy
making processes. The criminal justice policy community can incorporate an eclectic mix of
pressure groups, government agencies, media and academics (Pross:1986). After identifying
this contextual environment a structure within which to examine the process is needed.
Jones and Newburn (2006) endorse Kingdon‘s framework involving the analysis of three
concurrent ‗process streams‘ (1995). These streams include the ‗problem stream‘ ‗policy
stream‘ and ‗political stream‘ that flow independently but converge to direct policy. The
‗problem stream‘ generates problems demanding policy makers‘ attention.

The ‗policy

stream‘ is devoted to formulation of policy ideas whilst the ‗political stream‘ encapsulates the
public mood within policy decision-making. Kingdon concludes that policies emerge when
these process streams converge and ‗solutions become joined to problems and both of them
are joined to favourable political forces‘ (1995). Often there are ‗policy entrepreneurs‘ who
lobby for the introduction of policies as the solution to a problem. These ‗entrepreneurs‘
react quickly to emerging ‗policy windows‘ opened by political winds that favour the
18

promotion of their particular policy solution. Kingdon cautions that proposals can be stymied
if powerful interests are not accommodated. It is for this reason that Stolz recommends that
researchers also examine the ‘non decision making‘ to understand why some policies are
championed whilst others whither (2002:211).
The political process is particularly important to understand. Solomon (1981) cautioned that
political institutions influence proposal formation, clear proposal pathways and moderate
policy implementation. Therefore, Bernstein and Cashore (2000) advise researchers to focus
upon formal policy decisions such as legislation, regulation and statements which generally
capture ‗the actual choices of government’. Paul Sabatier believes however that confining
examination to those documents would only reveal a picture of one level or institution within
government and a limited view of the policy process pathway (1991:148). Sub-government
committee members, whilst sources of ‗knowledge‘ and ‗methodology‘ for policy makers,
are often selectively chosen to facilitate consensus policy making which ensures safe passage
through policy making currents (Rock 1995). Policy survival is increased if consensus policy
making, favoured by politicians, is possible (Rock 1995).
The approval by institutional interests of the proposed policy is vital for its success. Rock
(1995) describes these institutional interests as being ‗independent but interdependent’.
Institutional interests often overpower human rights advocacy groups.

This may have

relevance to Ireland as Kilommins et al (2004) noted that ‘expertise has lost its hold as policy
has succumbed to populism and incessant fear of crime'. Rock noted that policy communities
are acutely attuned to the ‗attentive public‘. The ‗attentive public‘ includes victims support
organisations or special interest groups who capture government attention when formulating
policy. Roe (1994:34) commented upon the increasing necessity for ‗policy narratives’ that
there is a need to explain arguments supporting policies, especially prevalent when the
evidence based foundations underlying policies are weak. Increased politicisation within a
consensus policy making structure is a feature of European politics.
2.6

The Policy Processes in the European Union

There is evidence of increased politicisation in the operation of the pillar structures of the
European Union. In 2005, common interest subjects were divided into three subject areas
known as ‗pillars‘, the third of which related to justice and home affairs. Despite this
structural division, Bazacq (2008) observed that ‗the fight against terrorism creates a field
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within which legal mechanisms of the pillars are overridden by the political ‘necessity’ of the
time‘ so matters often proceed at intergovernmental level rather than within the European
Commission or Parliament. Consequently, framework decisions bypass the European Union
legislative procedure of decision making thereby lessening public debate and diminishing the
Commission and European Court of Justice (Balzaq: 2008). This is perhaps unsurprising
given that terrorism is a globalised political threat which national criminal justice systems are
ineffective at taming alone.
Framework decisions required unanimity in 2001. Therefore, decisions by Justice and Home
Affairs Ministers are made subsequent to successful negotiations at diplomatic level within
the ‗Committee of the Permanent Representatives‘ (C.O.R.E.P.E.R.), at technocratic level
with the ‗Comite d‘Article Trente Six‘ (C.A.T.S.) and within ten working groups. (Walker
2000a, den Boer and Wallace 2001:514-15). Therefore, it is clear that such supranational
institutions are significant players in policy transfer Kardstedt (2002). The significance of
their role in policy transfer has lead Loader (2002) to question the democratic legitimacy of
this process of transfer given that these administrative bodies are not elected. Therefore, we
require tools to enable the examination of whether and to what extent policy transfer has
impacted upon the definitions of terrorism adopted in the Act.
2.7

Policy Transfer and Convergence

The question of whether and how policy transfers is controversial within the field of policy
analysis. Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer as:
‘the process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions,
and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, and ideas in another political
system (2000:5)’
In addition, Jones and Newburn (2007) recommend reviewing the role of ‗human agency‘
driving policy transfer as well as examining the cultural and political environment into which
policies are transposed. International developments may urge the enactment of legislation
but the form of implementation involves domestic policy choices within Irish policy-making
processes. Theorists have distinguished between policy transfer and policy convergence.
Jones and Newburn (2007) describe ‗policy transfer‘ as involving an acknowledged political
commitment to espouse a policy whereas Kerr (1983:3) describes policy convergence as ‗the
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tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structure, processes and
performance’. Similarly, Bennett (1991:219) describes policy convergence as a ‗process‘
rather than a state of being whereby policies ‗become‘ more alike. The more contemporary
view of Jones and Newburn (2007) is that policy convergence evolves because of ‗structural
and cultural shifts influenced by the effects of globalisation (2007:22)‘. The four separate
methods by which policy convergence evolves were described by Bennett (1991) as
emulation, elite networking, harmonisation and penetration.

Emulation involves the

deliberate imitation of policies from another country. By contrast ‗elite networking‘ relates
to professional groupings that interact regularly at a super-national basis, outside domestic
politics, who determine to promote a particular policy. More pertinent to this study are
‗harmonisation‘ and ‗penetration‘. Crawford (2009: 21) observed that harmonisation was
relevant to the third pillar dealing with crime and security, promoting as it does increased cooperation. He also cautioned that whilst European Union directives often commence life by
harmonisation, they had penetrative effect at domestic level (Crawford 2009: 22).
Convergence does not always result in homogeny of effect. Policy convergence can occur at
a number of levels so as to accommodate domestic political and cultural influences. Bennett
(1991: 218) pointed to five different layers of convergence which should be examined before
determining whether there has been complete convergence. These include the policy goals,
policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes and policy style. Jones and Newburn
(2007) acknowledge the usefulness of Bennett models on policy convergence with one
proviso that it failed to account for the impact of unexpected events upon the ‗structural and
cultural‘ landscape. Ireland had not suffered a terrorist attack or other such unexpected event
immediately before the drafting of this Bill. Therefore, it is unexplained why these terrorist
definitions were introduced following the Good Friday Agreement (1998). This raises the
question:
‘the dearth of rigorous evaluations of counter terrorism efforts raises an obvious
question; on what are policy makers basing their strategies to counter terrorism’
(Dugan: 2009)
The policy analysis sought to evaluate from where, whom and how the definitions
surrounding terrorism emerged and whether the theoretical perspectives of control or risk are
evident in their formulation.

21

CHAPTER 3
3. METHODOLOGY
The policy analysis undertaken involved a qualitative documentary analysis of mainly
publicly available information.

Travis (1983:46) recommends qualitative methodology

‗especially in the area of criminal justice policy analysis’. Documentary analysis has been
described as ‘a process of evaluating documents in such a way that empirical knowledge is
produced and an understanding is developed’ (Bowen 2009:29). It is recommended that
documents be assessed for relevancy before being examined for thematic patterns (Bowen:
2009).

In this study, the documentary analysis partially involved the review of

documentation prepared for an alternative purpose.

Therefore, it was necessary to be

cognisant that such data, not specifically produced for this research, could deceive the
researcher into incorrectly ascribing latent meanings which the authors did not intend.
Robson (2002) calls this confusing the ‗witting‘ and ‗unwitting‘ evidence.

Equally,

documents do not always reveal biases or institutional interests of the creator. The validity of
documentary analysis research will always be dependent upon appropriate assessment of the
reliability and accuracy of the data source (Scott: 1990). Consequently, only reliable sources
of data have been chosen. Finally, once reliable data was retrieved, the data was examined for
relevancy and thematic patterns whilst a deductive approach was adopted to elicit any
evidence of crime control or risk perspectives within the data retrieved.
3.1

The Documentary Analysis

Data collected included documentation from whom Davis, Francis and Jupp (2011: 282)
identify as ‗sponsors of research‘ such as government departments. Departments also act as
‗gatekeepers‘ to such relevant information. Equally, organisations such as advocacy bodies,
government review committees and institutions within the criminal justice system support
research. Therefore, identification of and permission from gatekeepers was vital to
completing a successful policy analysis. In addition, Bernstein and Cashore (2000) advise
researchers to focus upon formal policy decisions such as legislation, regulation and
statements as these documents generally capture ‗the actual choices of government‘. Equally,
Stolz (2002: 211) recommends that studies also examine documentation relating to ‗non
decision making‘ that explain why some policy choices were championed whilst others
withered. Therefore, government data included the Irish and European legislation, Oireachtas
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debates and an interview with a policy official within the Department of Justice. In addition,
publications by committees established by the Irish and British Governments as part of the
Good Friday Agreement (1998) were examined as were publications by advocacy bodies
such as the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and the Irish Human Rights Commission.
3.2

Documents Examined

3.2.1 Legislation
The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002 and the subsequent Act were the main
focus as these documents first introduced the definitions. As this Act was incorporated
within the existing framework of the Offences against the State Acts 1939 and its
amendments, those Acts were also considered.

These Acts and Bill were accessed on

www.oireachtas.ie. having searched using the terms ‗Acts and Bills‘.
3.2.2 Oireachtas Debates
The Dáil and Seanad debates relating to the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002
are available on the Oireachtas website www.oireachtas.ie. This website includes a section
entitled ‗Bills & Legislation‘. The website details the progression of the Bill through the
legislative process from its initial presentation on the 16 December 2002 before being finally
being passed by the Oireachtas on the 23 February 2005. These relevant dates are linked to
debates in the Dáil, Seanad and the Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and
Women‘s Rights. Discussions within the Select Committee provided most detail as more
time was allowed to debate and explore the definitions, proposed amendments and discuss the
contextual framework around the Bill. Dáil debates are published almost contemporaneously
whilst the Seanad and Committee debates are available within days. Oireachtas debates,
contemporaneous in nature, illuminate the concerns of politicians, both local and
international, within a capsule of time and provide direct insight into policies. The debates
identified policy actors and networks that negotiated the policy stream up until the enactment
of the Bill. Most revealing, the debates identified important policy actors both beyond Irish
borders.
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3.2.3 European Framework Decision
On the 19 September 2001, the European Commission presented to the Council of the
European Union a ‗Proposal for a Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism‘ (2001). A
‗Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism‘ was agreed by the Council of Justice and
Home Affairs Ministers on the 13 June 2002. This decision was implemented by Ireland in
the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. A copy of the Framework Decision and
Commission Proposal are available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu.

In 2004, the European

Commission published a review of the implementation process amongst Member States
which is available on www.europa.eu. To understand the European policy making processes,
the Council of the European Union website (www.european-council.europa.eu) was accessed
and valuable information gleamed as to Councils‘ competency and structures. Those
structures changed following the Lisbon Treaty (2009). Also, these sources revealed that
Ireland held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on the 11 March 2004
when Madrid suffered a terrorist bombing. A press release entitled ‗European Council to
focus on Fight against Terrorism‘ was released by An Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, then Council
President (2004).
3.2.4 Department of Justice and Equality
Ismaeli (2006) highlighted the sub-government level as being a key policy actor within the
policy process. Also, Jones and Newburn (2007) stressed the importance of gaining access to
key individuals working within this policy level. Davies (2011) advised that access to those
persons often involved a ‗gatekeeper‘. The researcher, through her employment in the Office
of the Director of Public Prosecutions, knew an official within the Department of Justice. A
request was made via this intermediary to conduct a semi structured interview with a relevant
person within the policy group with responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the
Act. The request was successful and a member of the policy group was interviewed in the
Department of Justice and Equality on the 20 August 2012. A draft of the literature review, a
timeline of dates relevant to the enactment of the Act, a list of information examined and
proposed open questions were provided in advance of the semi structured interview. Pepper
and Wildy (2009) recommend the preparation of such an ‗interview guide‘ so as to cover all
the principle avenues of questioning. The Department was assured that the researcher would
respect any concerns expressed about legal privilege or security. Confidentiality was assured
and the interview was recorded. It was agreed that the interviewee could review the thesis
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prior to submission so as to correct inaccuracies relating to the interview and that the
transcript of interview would be destroyed.
The interview focused upon factors underlying the decision to implement the Framework
Decision (2002) by maintaining and incorporating these obligations into the Offences against
the State Act 1939/1998 framework. The role played by domestic and external policy actors
and the influence of signal events such as the Madrid bombings on policy outcomes were
discussed. The interviewee provided invaluable information about the European institutional
networks; in particular about the relationship between the Permanent Representatives
Committee (C.O.R.E.P.E.R.), the now redundant C.A.T.S./Article 36 Committee and the
Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers. The oversight exercised by the European
Commission on implementation of decisions was also explored. At a national level, the
pressures that delayed the enactment of the Bill were discussed as were the mechanics by
which amendments are formulated between the Department of Justice, Equality and the
Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women‘s‘ Rights.
3.2.5 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences against the State Act 1939/98
The Irish Government agreed under the Good Friday Agreement (1998) to establish a
committee to ‘initiate a wide-ranging review of the Offences against the State Acts 19391985‘. The Committee was chaired by Mr Justice Anthony Hederman and included
representatives from the Judiciary, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions, Department of Justice Equality and Law Reform,
Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of An Taoiseach, An
Garda Síochána, the Irish Bar and criminal law academics.

The Committee sought

submissions from interested people and organisations. The Omagh bombing, on the 15
August 1998, led to the enactment of Offences against the State Act 1998 and the
Committee‘s terms of reference were extended to accommodate that Act. The terms of
reference also required the Committee to consider both national and international threats
posed by terrorism and organised crime. Despite those terms, however, the Committee
decided that although the bombings on the September 11, 2001 occurred during the
establishment of the Committee they would not reopen the report to consider the
‗undoubtedly serious and far-reaching implications of those attacks on public safety and
national security’ (1999: 18). Their report, published in May 2002, discusses persisting
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domestic threats to the Irish State and the proportionality of extant legal responses around the
time the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002 was drafted.
3.2.6 Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (I.I.C.D)
The reports of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (I.I.C.D.) also
provide contemporaneous information on domestic terrorist threats around the period when
the Bill was drafted. These reports are available on the Department of Justice and Equality
website (www.justice.ie) using internet searches terms ‗offences against the state act’ and
‗unlawful organisation’.

The I.I.C.D. was established pursuant to the Good Friday

Agreement (1998) to update the Irish and British Governments on decommissioning by
paramilitary groups. It exceeded its initial mandate and continued working until February
2010. Press releases from the I.I.C.D. as well as reports dated 26 September 2005, 19
January 2006 and 28 March 2011 were examined.

Helpfully, these reports alerted the

researcher to reports from the Independent Monitoring Commission.
3.2.7 Independent Monitoring Commission (I.M.C.)
The Independent Monitoring Commission (I.M.C) was established in the United Kingdom
under the Northern Ireland (Monitoring Commission) Act 2003. The Commission reported
every six months on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland and provided statistics of
paramilitary murders, shooting and assaults since March 2003. Their twenty fifth report,
dated the 4 November 2010, is available on www.official-documents.gov.uk. Again, these
reports provided contextual background to domestic terrorist threats
3.2.8 Irish Human Rights Commission
The Irish Human Rights Commission (2004) published a ‗Commentary on the Criminal
Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002‘ which is available on their website (www.ihrc.ie). The
Commission, established pursuant to the Human Rights Act 2000, promote human rights in
Ireland. Their report raised concerns about the necessity for such legislation and of the
absence of renewal provisions.

The Commission made specific observations as to the

proposed definitions in the bill which were subsequently discussed in Oireachtas.
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3.2.9 Irish Council for Civil Liberties (I.C.C.L)
The Irish Council of Civil Liberties (I.C.C.L) is an independent human rights organisation
who defines its role as reviewing the observance of human rights within Irish society. It
exercises an independent supervisory role over legislation, often canvassing for change or
cautioning against any diminution of human rights standards in Irish life. In April 2003 the
I.C.C.L. published a briefing document on the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill
2002.

This publication influenced discussions within the Select Committee on Justice,

Equality, Law Reform and Women‘s rights in 2003 and 2004.
3.2.10 Limitations
Information sources on the policy making processes within the Council of Ministers and its
supporting committees was limited to secondary sources. Therefore, the policy review does
not provide a comprehensive picture of the policy making landscape, community,
interdependences and networks of relationships that influence policy making within the
Council. The policy analysis did not examine street level policy implementation which limits
any findings on the extent of policy convergence. The thesis does not review terrorist
legislation predating the Act within control and risk perspectives. However, the extending of
evidential, procedural and definitional provisions found in the Offences against the State Act
1939/1998 to the new Act does influence the theoretical conclusions.
3.2.11 Ethical Considerations
Qualitative research can more problematic in terms of ensuring confidentiality and anonymity
(Gregory 2003:53). Therefore, given the topic, it was decided a policy analysis involving
public documentation was most appropriate.

However, to ensure research integrity an

interview was conducted with a policy official in the Department of Justice. The interviewee
was made aware of the context of the study so as to facilitate informed consent. The
interview was recorded and a transcript prepared.

The interviewee was afforded the

opportunity to review details of the interview as recorded in the thesis so as to ‗correct the
record‘ if necessary. This was facilitated and a copy of the thesis was furnished. Consent was
obtained prior to submission. An undertaking was given to destroy the transcript of the
interview and any paper copies. The interviewee was also assured of anonymity given the
evident security concerns surrounding any research on terrorism. The researcher, a solicitor
in the prosecution service, was cognisant of potential professional biases during the research
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process and the necessity to advise readers of her employment so as to inform any
interpretation of any findings and conclusions. Nicholson (2005) commented that whilst
ethical guidelines are useful, they do not provide the answer to every ethical difficulty that
may arise.
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CHAPTER 4
4. FINDINGS
This chapter will review the policy sources identified and elicit their contribution to policy
formation. They are arranged chronologically to capture the progression of the definitional
changes to terrorist legislation in Ireland, commencing with the ‗Hederman Committee‘
(2002). Ireland‘s anti-terrorist legislation, a remnant of our troubled political history, was
examined within the peace making process. The Committee produced both majority and
minority reports (2002).
4.1

Report of the Committee to review the Offences against the State Acts 1939/98

The Good Friday Agreement (1998) was passed by referendum on the 22 May 1998. The
Irish Government undertook to ‗initiate a wide-ranging review of the Offences against the
State Act 1939 with a view to both reform and dispensing with those elements no longer
required as circumstances permit’. A Committee was established in May 1999 under the
chairmanship of Judge Anthony Hederman and the Committee became known as the
‗Hederman Committee‘. Legislation was dissected to assess its compliance with
constitutional and international obligations in the expectation of reduced security
requirements in Northern Ireland. The Committee acknowledged emerging threats from
international terrorism. The Committee also held oral sessions during which they heard from
Eamonn Barnes, former D.P.P. and Patrick Byrne, Former Garda Commissioner. In addition,
the chairperson attended EUROPOL, the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of
Europe and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
4.1.1 Defining Terrorism
The Hederman Committee acknowledged that the right to life also imposes obligations on
States to protect citizens against terrorism. In light of September 11, 2001 they observed that
(2002:37):
‗Following the events of 11 September 2001, there has been an increased recognition,
both within the European Union and the International Community of the severe threat
which international terrorism poses to the enjoyment of human rights’(2002:26)
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The Hederman Committee acknowledged that balancing the wish to preserve the security of
democratic States and observe human, civil and political rights of citizens, makes the task of
defining terrorism extremely difficult and that is especially problematic in relation the
international context (2002:10 /13).
4.1.2 International and Domestic Terrorist Threats
The Committee considered the Offences against the State Act 1939/1998 inadequate to
address international terrorist threats then emerging. They recommended that new legislation
be built upon the Offences against the State Act 1939/98 to accommodate that lacuna
(2002:34). The majority of the Committee felt that sufficient domestic terrorist threat
remained, necessitating the retention of the Special Criminal Court. The majority observed
that:
‗the security risk is sufficiently high to justify the retention of the Court on this ground
alone….that as long as there is in existence a paramilitary threat to public peace, the
need for the special criminal court will remain’ (2002:224).
Curiously, they also commented that Irish society differed from comparable common law
countries because our population is ‗small and dispersed‘ which increases the risk of jury
intimidation.
4.1.3 International Conventions on Terrorism
Their report listed thirteen international conventions on terrorism, identifying eight that were
signed or ratified by Ireland (2002:49). The Committee observed that non- implementation
of conventions did not imply our legislation was ineffective to address the threats identified
in those conventions. Subsequently, four unimplemented conventions were incorporated in
the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. The Committee noted that the United
Nations Security Council resolution 1373 on international terrorism, adopted on the 12
September 2001, requested that conventions be implemented and terrorist financing
suppressed. The Hederman report (2002) predated the ‗Framework Decision on Combatting
Terrorism‘ agreed on the 13 June 2002.

However, the Committee acknowledged that

developments within in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, originating with the Maastricht
Treaty (1992), allowed the European Council to adopt framework decisions, similar to
directives, but without direct effect (2003:38).
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4.1.4 Evidential Provisions
The majority report determined that section 3(2) of the Offences against the State
(Amendment) Act 1972, admitting into evidence the belief of a chief superintendent as to
membership of an unlawful organisation, should remain in force as corroborative evidence.
This recommendation was vehemently rejected by Professor Bryan McMahon a Human
Rights Commissioner and Professor Dermot Walsh, both of whom published minority
reports.
4.1.5 Offences of Assisting and Financing Terrorism
The majority report recommended the replacement of section 22 of the Offences against the
State Act 1939 and section 2 Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1985 with
provisions akin to the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 to enable the seizure of terrorist property.
In addition, they recommended a supplemental offence of rendering assistance to an unlawful
organisation be created. Similarly, they advised that section 8 of the Offences against the
State (Amendment) Act 1998, an offence of directing an unlawful organisation, be restated to
criminalise other supportive acts that assist unlawful organisations. Another suggestion was
that section 19 be amended to provide for the suppression of international terrorist groups.
Additional recommendations included the restatement of documentary offences prohibited by
sections 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the principal Act. The Hederman Committee recommendations
were partially implemented in sections 5, 6, 7, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 of the Criminal Justice
(Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, but many remain outstanding.
4.2

The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning

The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (I.I.C.D) reports reveals
that the IRA and INLA were continuing to decommission weapons until February 2012.
Their final report (2012) reveals that the IRA only partially engaged with decommissioning
in 2002 when the bill was drafted. Following pressure from Sinn Fein leadership in April
2005, decommissioning was declared complete the following September but factions within
the IRA and the INLA continued to decommission until February 2012.
4.3

The Independent Monitoring Commission

The final report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (I.M.C.) (2010) provides
statistics on paramilitary shootings, assaults and murders, since March 2003. Between 2003
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and 2005 paramilitary violence escalated within loyalist communities with some reduction in
republican communities. However, the I.M.C. cautioned that during this period republican
paramilitaries continued to engage in unlawful activity. In 2003 the peace process was not a
settled reality.
4.4

The Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism

4.4.1 Approximation and Harmonisation
The European Council was authorised, pursuant to article 34 of the Treaty of the European
Union (Amsterdam Treaty:1997), to take unanimous decisions so as to ‗promote
cooperation,… contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union’. These decisions
aim to achieve ‘approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States… but shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’. Ireland retains a
parliamentary reservation such that the Oireachtas must be consulted prior to deciding to
engage in negotiations to adopt a framework decision.
4.4.2 The European Commission
The draft proposal for a Council framework decision originated from the European
Commission (2001). This was presented to the Council on the 19 September 2001, some
days after September 11, 2001. Coincidentally, the European Parliament had adopted a
resolution on the 5 September 2001 relating to the role of the European Union in combating
terrorism. The Oireachtas debates reveal that European discussions took place between
C.OR.E.P.E.R, C.A.T.S. and the Council of Ministers before a draft declaration was agreed in
December 2001, which formed the basis for the Framework Decision on Combatting
Terrorism. The function of these European committees will be further explained in paragraph
4.5. The proposal (2001) noted that bombings in the U.S.A. ‗highlight the inadequacy of
traditional forms of judicial and police co-operation in combatting it’ (2001:3) necessitating
the ‗approximation’ of terrorist legislation between Member States to limit advantages seized
by terrorists arising from differing legal systems. Security and justice issues do not normally
concern the Commission but they observed that because terrorist offences ‗affect different
legal rights’ it demanded attention. The Commission observed that only six Member States
had laws covering terrorism (2001:7). The Framework decision on Combatting Terrorism
agreed on the 13 June 2002
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4.4.3 Definition of Terrorist Offences
The key term upon which agreement was sought was ‗terrorist offence‘ in order to distinguish
it from an ordinary offence. Article 1 specified categories of wrongdoing that, if carried out
with the necessary intent, would become ‗terrorist offences‘, most of which are already
synonymous with terrorism. The mens rea or intent necessary to commit such a terrorist
offence was defined in article 1 of the Framework Decision. This intent provision was
specified in the European Commission Proposal (2001). It required an accused to have
intended to intimidate a population or compel a government or international organisation to
do or refrain from doing an act, or have the intent of ‗seriously destabilising or destroying the
fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or
international organisation’. In addition, the Framework Decision sought to limit resources
available to terrorist groups by penalising persons who direct or participate in terrorist
activity or who supply funds or information to such groups. Similarly, articles 3 and 4
required that offences be proscribed prohibiting the assisting or ‗inciting or aiding or
abetting’ of terrorist offences.

These definitions again originated from the European

Commission.
4.4.4 Definition of Terrorist Groups
The definition proposed by the Commission for ‗terrorist group‘ was subsequently adopted in
the Framework Decision. The Commission indicated that this definition emanated from the
definition of ‗criminal organisations‘ contained in a joint action proposal dealing with
organised crime (2001:8). A terrorist group is defined as ‘a structured group of more than
two persons established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist
offences’.
4.4.5 Penalties and Victims
The Commission had sought to fix sentencing parameters obliging Member States to impose
higher ‗effective proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties for terrorist offences, which can be
reduced when offenders recant or assist authorities in combatting terrorism. The Framework
Decision partially adopted that proposal but linked increased penalties to aggravating
circumstances and lesser penalties to apply when mitigating circumstances exist such as when
an accused person provides assistance to authorities or denounces terrorism. The European
Commission proposal had placed particular emphasis on the assistance to be given to victims.
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The Framework Decision adopted that provision requiring that Member States give assistance
to victims and ensure that terrorist prosecutions can proceed without a complaint.
4.4.6 Jurisdiction to Prosecute
The Framework Decision sought to further international co-operation initiatives. Member
States were obliged to extend their jurisdictional limits over nationally registered aircraft,
ships and residents. Countries were obliged to co-operate to facilitate the prosecution of
terrorism. The European Commission had proposed that ‗legal persons‘, such as limited
liability companies, also attract liability to enable the extension of the prosecutorial arm of
Member States to rogue companies. This proposal was largely translated into the Framework
Decision
4.4.7 European Commission Reports on Implementation
Member States were obliged to notify the European Commission of their implementation
proposals before the 31 December 2002. The Commission would then assess the adequacy of
those proposals by the 31 December 2003.

The first implementation report of the

Commission noted that:
‘Although structurally similar to other instruments aimed at harmonisation of a
particular field of criminal law, this framework decision thus differs from those that do
not require the incorporation of specific offences as long as the conduct to be
criminalised is already covered by a generic incrimination’(2004:5).
By this time, the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002 was drafted and the
Commission had noted it would substantially comply with the Framework Decision. They
expressed some reservation about the proposed penalty provisions. Most Member States
created new offences for terrorist crimes but the Commission observed that Ireland was
‗amending‘ legislation. Their next report (2007) noted that Ireland was the only country to
have incorporated the definition of ‗terrorist offence‘ into law (2007:7). In addition, whilst
observing that Ireland had complied with most of the Framework Decisions they believe
Ireland had only partially given effect to articles 9 and 10, those provisions relating to
assisting victims, defining of jurisdictional limits and the introducing of co-operative
measures facilitating jurisdictional decision making between States as to the prosecution of
terrorist offences.
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4.5

Department of Justice and Equality

4.5.1 Genesis of the Act
The purpose of the meeting with a member of the policy unit responsible for the development
of the Act was to elicit the domestic and international drivers of the legislation.

The

perspective presented by the Department will reflect official policy but such information is
important when placed within the contextual background described by other sources. The
starting point identified by the policy official were the UN Resolutions 1373 and 1368 that
requested countries to implement anti-terrorism conventions. Subsequently, the European
Union developed a road map tracing the implementation by each member states of those
conventions.

At this time the Financial Action Task Force (F.A.T.F.), an anti-money

laundering body, made additional recommendations and European Union Members States
were urged to implement forty six recommendations. Finally, the Framework Decision on
Combatting Terrorism was agreed on the 13 June 2002. Member States had thirty six months
within which to implement. In summary, Ireland had obligations to implement outstanding
United Nations conventions on terrorism, forty six recommendations from the F.A.F.T. and
the Framework Decision. These commitments culminated in the drafting of the Criminal
Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002. The Department established a special international
terrorist unit whose objective was to facilitate the implementation of these international
obligations within the short time frame.
4.5.2 European Policymaking Explained
The policy process by which the Framework Decision or co-operative measures are agreed
was explained. The Department is represented at the Council of the European Union by an
assistant secretary from the International Policy Division within the Department who attends
C.A.T.S. C.A.T.S. was established under article 36 in the Treaty of the European Union
(Amsterdam Treaty:1997). This Committee co-ordinates smaller working groups which
examine issues relevant to justice and home affairs. C.A.T.S. reports to the C.O.R.E.P.E.R.
who prepare work schedules for the Council of Ministers and report upon progress in areas of
common interest. The Irish Ambassador represents Ireland at C.O.R.E.P.E.R. The Council
of Justice Ministers meet regularly to discuss police and judicial co-operation issues. The
Presidency of the Council of the European Union rotates and Ireland held the Presidency
when Madrid was bombed in March 2004.
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4.5.3 C.A.T.S. and Working Groups
The working groups reporting to C.A.T.S. include civil servants from Member States who
examine issues surrounding police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters.

The

Department official conceded that framework decisions can present definitional difficulties
during negotiations within working groups and upon implementation nationally given the
different cultural and operational practices between civil and common law jurisdictions.
These working groups, comprising of civil servants from Member States perform work
carried out domestically by Members of Parliament, that is negotiating definitions.
Definitions agreed in these working groups can ultimately adopted by the Council of
Ministers in a framework decision but it was not indicated whether this was the position with
this Framework.
4.5.4 Irish Policy Making
The Department official advised that the Hederman Committee report did not direct the
drafting of the Bill as that report was only published in May 2002 expressing divergent views
which the Government needed to debate before accepting or rejecting recommendations. In
the interim there were deadlines within which international agreements had to be
implemented. The Framework Decision (2001) required Member States to submit proposals
to the Commission by December 31, 2002 and the European Union created a roadmap on
implementation of conventions by Member States which was updated every six months.
Whilst the Hederman report exerted limited influence on the Bill, the decision to incorporate
the Framework definition of ‗terrorist groups‘ within the Offences Against the State Act
1939/1998 structure did conform with a Hederman Committee recommendation. The policy
official advised that another reason for that decision was that dissident republicans remained
ideologically tied to the IRA, who continued to be active and subject to a suppression order,
such that international terrorism had to be accommodated within that framework.
The Department policy unit liaised with the Attorney General‘s office about the Bill. The
legislative process may involve the Department providing explanations to the Select
Committee for Justice and Equality, but not advising. The official believed that this did not
happen with this Bill and this was corroborated upon reading the Oireachtas debates. The
Department official confirmed that, as part of the process, the Minister would be aware of
opinions from the Human Rights Commission. The Bill, whilst presented to the Oireachtas in

36

December 2002, was delayed due to the need to incorporate additional international
obligations relating to the European arrest warrants and a European directive on the
‗Processing of Personal Data and Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications
Sector‘ (2002/58EC).
4.6

The Human Rights Commission

The Human Rights Commission (2004) published a ‗Commentary on the Criminal Justice
(Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002‘ which excludes parts 6 and 7 of the Bill as those amendments
were only included at report stage. Importantly, they questioned the necessity for such
‗emergency‘ legislation, without a renewal clause and in the absence of any assessment of
International terrorist threats targeting Ireland.
4.6.1 The Committee to Review the Offences against the State Act 1939/98
The Commissioners criticised the failure to systematically review the Offences against the
State Act 1939-1998 in line with recommendations of the Hederman Committee (2002).
Professor William Binchy, a Human Rights Commissioner, was also a member of the
Hederman Committee who had delivered a dissenting opinion to that report (2002). Criticism
was directed at the reactivation of sections 2 and 8 of the Offences against the State Act 1985,
emergency legislation that had lapsed without renewal, as permanent provisions.

The

Commission expressed surprise that the Irish Government faithfully complied with the
Framework Decision by inserting agreed definitions agreed yet failed to review section 47 of
the Offences against the State Act 1939, allowing the D.P.P. to direct trial in the Special
Criminal Court, despite criticism from the United Nations Human Rights Committee.
4.6.2 Process of Harmonisation
In addition, the Commissioners, whilst acknowledging the authority of the Council of
Ministers to agree a framework decision pursuant to article 34 of the Amsterdam Treaty
(1997), questioned whether the process of harmonisation extended to obligating Member
States to transpose precise definitions and penalty provisions into domestic legislation. They
observed that the penalty for membership of an unlawful organisation was only increased
because of the Framework Decision. The Human Rights Commission issued the following
caution about the framework decision making process:
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‘...in this harmonisation process insufficient emphasis has been placed on the need to
ensure that the protection of fundamental rights is preserved when both the state and
supra-national state actions is in operation’ (2004:5)
4.6.3 Proposed Definitions
When expressing concerns about transposition of exact definitions the Commission identified
‗terrorist activity‘ as being the key term. The Commissioners argued that the breadth of the
definition potentially labelled campaigning protesters, who present no risk to life, as
terrorists. An amendment to the Bill was proposed but ultimately a less comprehensively
worded amendment was inserted into the Act. The Commissioners questioned the capability
of the Gardai to identify ‗terrorist groups‘ with accuracy.

Any such difficulty was

compounded by the failure to provide that ‗terrorist offences‘ can only be committed when
directed at ‗democratic and accountable governments‘ (2004:7).

The correlation of the

definition of ‗terrorist group‘ with ‗unlawful organisation‘ within the meaning of the
Offences against the State Act 1939 was criticised because of evidential and prosecutorial
powers that flow which the Commission described as ‗exceptional‘.
4.6.4 Evidential implications
The absence of definitional safeguards alarmed the Commissioners. In particular they noted
that corroborative evidence from a Chief Superintendent as to membership is admissible in
trials pursuant to under section 3(2) of the Offences against the State Act 1972. In addition,
the Bill included an evidential presumption of intent in section 6(5) which the Commission
suggested should be amended requiring a court be satisfied ‗beyond reasonable doubt‘ that
the offences were committed with necessary intent. The Commission stated that rebuttable
presumptions are extremely difficult to rebut in practice but are more dangerous when the
information supporting the presumption emanates from an untested source outside Ireland
where cultural nuances and police or investigative practices substantially differ.
4.7

The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (I.C.C.L.)

The Irish Council of Civil Liberties (I.C.C.L.) expressed some similar reservations in their
report examining the Bill‘s compatibility with human rights (2003). They observed that
previous enactments directed at terrorism were introduced as ‗emergency‘ powers, involving
temporary suspension of rights, whereas the new provisions would be permanently affect
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rights. Their commentary was discussed by opposition politicians during Oireachtas debates
but reservations expressed by the I.C.C.L. did alter the text of the Bill.
4.7.1 Defining Terrorism
Ireland, despite our political history, had not defined the term ‗terrorism‘ within our
legislation so the I.C.C.L. questioned the need to do so at that time. Emphasising this point
they noted that Commissioner Patrick Byrne assured the Joint Oireachtas Committee on
Justice, Equality, Defence and Women‘s Rights that Gardai had sufficient powers to address
terrorist threats (January 2003). They cautioned that the wide category of acts that potentially
constitute terrorism could potentially criminalise strikers or protesters which, if the proposed
penalties provisions were adopted to the letter, could lead to disenfranchisement. Equally,
they argued that the extra territorial provisions could criminalise legitimate international
democratic movements.
4.7.2 Evidential Implications
Similar to the Irish Human Rights Commission, the I.C.C.L. criticised the rebuttable
presumption as to intent submitting that it constituted both a shift of the legal and evidential
burden of proof onto the accused. They were equally critical of the decision to adopt the
recommendation of the majority report of the Hederman Committee (2002) that persons
charged with terrorist offences continue to be tried before the Special Criminal Court.
4.7.3 Process of Harmonisation
The I.C.C.L. reviewed the Framework decision making process observing that these
decisions constitute ‗quasi-legislation‘ as they are politically binding whilst not legally
binding. They acknowledged that Ireland did exercise a parliamentary reservation so as to
enable the Oireachtas to consider the decision prior to adoption but in reality no realistic
opportunity was given to parliament to examine the implications of the proposal. In
concluding, the I.C.C.L. quoted Statewatch who observed that framework decisions were;
‗going ahead in an atmosphere where policing is contaminated by the ongoing war on
terrorism’ (I.C.C.L.:2003).
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4.8

Oireachtas Debates

4.8.1 Minister Introduces Draft Framework Decision
The Minister for Justice, John O‘Donoghue introduced the proposed Framework Decision to
the Oireachtas in December 2001. The Minister noted that efforts to approximate terrorist
legislation originated with article 24 of the Treaty of European Union (1992). He advised the
Oireachtas that the European Commission presented the Proposal to Council on the 20
September 2001 which was subsequently refined at Council meetings on the 16 October 2001
and 16 November 2001 before political agreement was reached on the 6/7 December 2001.
Minister O‘Donoghue commented whilst outlining the draft Framework Decision before the
Seanad that:
‗Ireland’s experience in combatting terrorism means that our existing legislation in
this regard is more comprehensive than the provisions in the proposal’ (Dáil Debates
2001 Vol. 168 No 23).
He further commented that the bombings on September 11, 2001 demonstrated ‗the choice
between good and evil’ (Dáil Debates 2001 Vol. 168 No 23). The Seanad debate took place
at 12.35 a.m. upon an incomplete draft of the Framework Decision, thus limiting meaningful
debate. The Dáil was equally unhappy with time afforded for parliamentary scrutiny of the
draft furnished. The rush to approve the proposed draft framework denied the Oireachtas of
an opportunity to properly examine and debate.
4.8.2 Policy Making within the Council of Ministers
Minister O‘Donoghue advised that once the Proposal from the European Commission was
received, negotiations took place during meetings of the European Council of Ministers,
between senior officials within C.A.T.S and C.O.R.E.P.E.R. to achieve consensus. Minister
Michael McDowell was appointed Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in June
2002. On the 17 December 2002 he elaborated upon this decision making process within
C.O.R.E.P.E.R. before the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and
Women‘s‘ Rights. He advised that C.O.R.E.P.E.R. arranges priorities into ‗A‘ and ‗B‘ lists,
the former consisting of matters that are ‗agreed or compromises reached‘. Before matters
reach the ‗A‘ list they are subject to ‗detailed discussions‘.

This is noteworthy when

considering Minister Donoghue‘s comments to the Dáil when he confirmed that ‗textual
corrections’ in the draft Framework Decision would be ‗tidied up by the Council secretariat‘
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and that only ‗substantial‘ changes would return to the Oireachtas (Dáil Debates 2001: Vol.
168:23).
4.8.3 The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill 2002
Michael McDowell was appointed Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform shortly
before the Bill was presented to the Dáil on the 16 December 2002. During the second stage
Minister McDowell cautioned that dissident republican and loyalist groups remained active.
He referred to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1368, adopted on the 12
September 2001, which required signatory States to ‗work together urgently to prevent and
suppress terrorist acts, including through increased co-operation and full implementation of
the relevant conventions relating to terrorism’(2001).

Later, the UN Security Council

adopted resolution 1373 (2001) which obliged States to implement international agreements.
Consequently, the Bill implemented the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages (1979), the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973). In addition, our membership of the European
Union required enactment of the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism (2002). On
the 17 December 2002, a day after the Bill was presented to the Dáil, the Garda
Commissioner appeared before the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence
and Women‘s‘ Rights and advised that special units had been set up to address international
terrorism but commented that ‗I do not envisage any particular threat to this country at this
time’ (Select Committee debates: 2002).
4.8.4 Defining Terrorism
The Oireachtas debates on the defining of terrorism proved extremely contentious. Minister
for State Mary Hanafin revealed, on the 5 February 2003, that only four European Member
States had defined terrorism within their own legislation before the Framework Decision.
Aonghus O‘Snodaigh T.D., a member of the Select Committee, noted that the UN Policy
Working Group had failed to arrive at an agreed definition of terrorism other than its
tendency to target civilians (Dáil Committee debates: 3/11/2004).

Deputy Joe Costello

questioned the necessity for such ‗stark legislation‘ in a neutral country (Dáil Debates 2003:
Vol. 560 No. 3). Minister McDowell, at committee stage, acknowledged that the Framework
Decision defined terrorism widely and conceded that the urgency created in the ‗aftermath of
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a crisis’ may have been a factor. However, he emphasised that Ireland was obliged to
implement the Framework Decision in accordance with both treaties and the Constitution and
stated that ‗the framework decision even overrides our constitution’(Committee Stage:
3/4/2011).
4.8.5 Definitions of Terrorist Groups and Activity
Debates on the definitions, in part 2 of the Bill, of ‗terrorist activity‘ and ‗terrorist groups‘
were particularly fractious. The Minister conceded that the expansive definitions for both
terms were not ideal, stating ‗that is how the Europeans decided it’ and observing that ‗when
one comes in contact with the civil law, this is what one ends up with‘ (Dáil Debates 2003:
Vol. 560 No 3). Minister McDowell however suggested the definition of ‗terrorist group‘ in
the Bill was structured so as to comply with the recommendation of the Hederman
Committee that the Offences against the State Act 1939/98 be amended to accommodate the
suppression of international terrorist groups. Article 4 of the framework decision required an
additional offence for rendering assistance to an unlawful organisation which mirrored,
according to Minister McDowell, a Hederman Committee recommendation. The Minister
also suggested that the new offence of rendering assistance to an unlawful organisation was
designed to address situations:
‗where persons are closely associated with unlawful organisations and actively further
their ends but are not, or it cannot be proven to be, members of the organisation (Dáil
Debates 2003: Vol. 560 No. 3)‘.
Similarly, Minister Hanafin (2003) said during the second stage that ‗we must not only choke
terrorist groups of funds, we must also starve them of volunteers’ (Dáil Debates 2003: Vol.
560. No.4)
4.8.6 Concern for Lawful Protests
The Oireachtas at all levels expressed concern that anti-globalisation protests or political
protests of any kind may become subject to this terrorist legislation. The Minister said that
the definition of a ‗terrorist group‘ as ‗a structured group of two or more than two people,
established over a period of time‘ was drafted to protect rioters being prosecuted as terrorists.
In response, one Dáil member noted that a terrorist group established at a particular time
would escape penalty under this legislation, to which the Minister responded ‗the definition of
terrorist group from the framework decision and that, therefore, we must go along with this’
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(Dáil Debates 2003: Vol. 560 No. 3). Ultimately, an assurance was provided in section 6(5)
of the Act confirming that a protest or strike would not ‗of itself‘ be a sufficient basis to bring
the conduct within the terrorist umbrella. It was argued that the layering of terrorist offences
upon existing criminal statues exposed citizens to prosecution for terrorist offences where
ordinary crimes were committed, that is where an ‗ordinary offence‘ is committed but with
the intent as defined in the Bill.
4.8.7 Definition of Intent
The intent necessary to carry out a terrorist offence includes the destabilisation of a
government and/or compelling a government to do or refrain from doing an act. The issue of
what constituted a ‗government‘ within that definition was controversial. An amendment
inserting ‗democratic governments‘ was rejected, with Minister McDowell announcing an
imperfect ‗compromise‘ such that the Attorney General can veto the continuation of a
prosecution for terrorist offences where the governments targeted are outside the EU. The
Minister believed it inappropriate for juries to determine whether a government was
legitimate or despotic requiring that the provision be exercised with ‗a small ‗p‘ in line with
political policy. The provision introduced in the Act does not allow the D.P.P. to continue a
prosecution for terrorist offence where the target government is outside the European Union
without the permission of the Attorney General. A similar reservation on the prosecutorial
powers of the D.P.P. is found in the Official Secrets Act 1963.
4.8.8 Presumption of Intent
The rebuttable evidential presumption of intent inserted in part 2 of the Bill was discussed at
length during the committee stage. Committee members commented that this evidential
presumption was criticised by both the Irish Human Rights Commission and the Irish Council
of Civil Liberties. The Minister observed that such presumptions were not unusual and the
burden of proof remained on the D.P.P. and that it is ‗merely forcing the accused person to
put into play such evidence as is at his disposal in respect of this issue of intent’(Select
Committee 3/11/2004).
4.8.9 Penalty Provisions
The period of the enhanced sentences for terrorist offences provided in the Bill, emanating
from the framework decision, were ultimately reduced in the Act. It was conceded by
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Minister McDowell that enhanced penalties, proscribed by the framework decision, had to be
enacted in a manner that accommodated judicial discretion. He also noted that sentences
suggested in the original draft of the original Bill would contravene our human rights
obligations.
4.8.10 Irish Residents
The Minister advised that the provision conferring jurisdiction to prosecute residents, in
addition to citizens, was necessary to confer prosecutorial jurisdiction over persons who
choose to remain stateless to avoid the prosecutorial power of their resident state to prosecute
them for actions outside that state.
4.8.11 Madrid Bombings
The select committee reviewed the Bill for a second time in November 2004. Since its
previous review Madrid had suffered a devastating terrorist bombing which led to the
election of a new government. Minister McDowell cautioned that the ‗threat has not gone
away’, ‗Madrid had reminded us we are vulnerable’ and that Ireland cannot ‘opt out of the
global reality’ (Dáil Debates 2004: Vol. 595.No.2). Throughout the debates the Minister was
reminded of concerns of Human Rights Commission and the Irish Council of Civil Liberties.
He acknowledged that submissions from the Human Rights Commission had led to further
Government consultations, contributing to the delay in enactment. In commending the Bill to
the Dáil, Minister McDowell said:
‗Important though it is and extensive its powers may be, it is directed towards ensuring
Ireland is not a society within which those planning to kill other innocent people can
find loopholes through which to carry out their cowardly plans’. (Dáil Debates 2003:
Vol. 560 No. 3)
4.9

Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005

The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 was finally enacted on the 8 March 2005.
It also incorporated additional obligations relating to European arrest warrants and the
retention of data such that the Act was radically different to initial Bill presented to the Dáil.
This review is confined to the terrorist related provisions in the Act.
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4.9.1 Definitions
The essential definitions are set out in part 2 of the Act. Whilst the definition of the ‗intent‘
necessary to carry out these terrorist offences mirrors that provided by article 2 of the
Framework Decision, many other Framework Decision definitions have been implemented in
a manner that accommodates existing definitions in Irish criminal law. The terms ‗terrorist
activity‘ and ‗terrorist-linked activity‘ are defined by corresponding existing offences, found
at parts 1 and 2 of the first schedule to the Act, with offence categories identified in articles 1
and 3 of the Framework Decision, which when carried out with the necessary intent
constitute ‗terrorist activity‘ or ‗terrorist-linked activity‘. Also, ‗terrorist group‘ is defined as
having ‗the same meaning as the Framework Decision‘ but, pursuant to section 5, these
groups also become unlawful organisations within the meaning of the Offences against the
State Act 1939-1998 becoming liable for prosecution of membership under that Act.
4.9.2 Offences of Supporting Terrorism
The Framework Decision required that additional offences be created prohibiting the inciting,
aiding, abetting, attempting, directing, participating, assisting or contributing to the activities
of terrorist groups. Many of these offences were already part of Irish law. Existing offences
included the directing of unlawful organisations, providing training in the use of firearms,
unlawfully collecting information or unlawfully printing publications.

In addition, our

common law tradition already provides for the prosecution of inchoate offences whilst
section 7 of the Criminal Law Act 1997 prohibits assisting offenders evade detection or
prosecution. Therefore, compliance with this obligation to criminalise these supportive roles
which assist terrorist groups was achieved by supplementing existing legislation with the
additional offence of rendering assistance (financial or otherwise) to an unlawful
organisation, contrary to section 21 A of the Offences Against the State Act 1939.
4.9.3 Terrorist Financing
The Act implements the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism 1999.
Offences of financing terrorism, or attempts thereof, are enacted in Part 4 of the Act. That
part also provides extensive powers to authorities to deal with ‗funds‘ ‗used or may be
intended for use in committing or facilitating the commission of an offence‘. The provision
overlaps with part 6 wherein an amended section 22 of the Offences against the State Act
1939 allows for the forfeiture and disposal of ‗funds‘ from unlawful organisations. This later
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provision implements a recommendation of the Hederman Committee.

However, the

evidential burdens of establishing a link between ‗funds‘ and unlawful activity is
substantially eased in the Act. Part 4 allows the admission of Garda evidence of his/her
belief that funds were to be used in committing or facilitating a terrorist offence in
proceedings to freeze those funds. Similarly, in part 6 a ministerial document confirming a
belief that the funds are the property of an unlawful organisation is admissible as evidence in
an application to freeze funds.
4.9.4 Evidential Implications
It is noteworthy that part 2 of the Act creates an evidential presumption of intent to engage in
terrorist activity, which was not required under the Framework Decision and provides
examples of circumstances where intent can be presumed. It does not contain any reservation
that acts have to be directed at ‗democratic governments‘. In addition, by transposing the
terrorist offences created by the Framework Decision into the Offences against the State Act
1939 structure, other evidential provisions will apply. The evidence of a chief superintendent
of his belief that an accused is a member of a ‗terrorist group‘ is admissible evidence
pursuant to section 3(2) of the Offences against the State Act 1972. Also, inferences can be
drawn from the conduct of an accused person under section 3(1) of the Offences against the
State Act 1972. A person suspected of membership of a ‗terrorist group‘ can be detained for
questioning for 48 hours without recourse to a Judge and may be tried before the Special
Criminal Court.
4.9.5 Extra-territorial Jurisdiction
The obligation to establish provisions addressing Ireland‘s extra territorial jurisdiction to
prosecute, required under article 9 of the Framework Decision, was implemented by defining
residency for that purpose in section 3(3) and by extending Irish jurisdictional limits in
section 6(2). Irish Courts can now exercise jurisdiction to prosecute acts committed by
persons, within or outside Ireland, if the person has been resident for 12 months. Cooperative measures as to prosecution and extradition of terrorists were further refined in
section 43(3) of the Act, which sets down the criteria when the D.P.P. has jurisdiction to
prosecute terrorist offences committed abroad in Irish Courts.

46

4.9.6 Politics with a small ‘p’
Not surprisingly, section 43(2) provides that the prosecution for terrorist related offences
contrary to section 6, 9, 10 or 11 cannot be charged without direction from the D.P.P. The
discretion and independence of the D.P.P. to decide to continue a prosecution is however
restricted by section 6(6) of the Act. This provides that where a person is charged with a
terrorist offence with intent to destabilise a government or political structure outside the
European Union, the trial cannot proceed without the consent of the Attorney General. This
provision enables the Irish Government to retain control over the international aspect of
terrorism.
4.9.7 Exemptions for Lawful Strikes or Protests
The Framework Decision specifically acknowledged in the preamble the right to strike or
protest which was not included in the Bill but finally adopted in the Act.
4.9.8 Victims
Victims do not receive special mention in the Act. Article 10 of the Framework Decision
obliged Member States to ‗ensure appropriate assistance‘ for victims and a commitment that
prosecutions can be brought in the absence of a complaint. Neither article gets specific
mention in the Act.

Curiously, the only other articles of the Framework Decision not

specifically implemented related to the requirement that ‗legal persons‘ also attract criminal
liability and that specific penalties be created for corporate bodies. Although not explained, it
is possible that the legislature believed that victims were provided with sufficient support
within our criminal justice system.
4.9.9 International Conventions
Part 3 of the Act implemented the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (1997), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Personnel (1973) and the Convention
against the Taking of Hostages (1979). Separate crimes of hostage taking, terrorist bombing,
and offences against internationally protected persons are defined in part 3 of the Act. The
actions constituting the later offence are defined by reference to existing Irish offences, such
that if done to an internationally protected person, become an offence against an
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internationally protected person.

However, the other offences created in part 3, those

offences of committing a terrorist bombing and of hostage taking, adopt only convention
language with little effort to reconcile those offences with existing similar offences in our
criminal legislation.
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CHAPTER 5
5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
5.1

Policy Analysis

5.1.1 Policy Making Environments
Kingdon (1995) advised that actors within the policymaking landscape be identified and an
understanding of the relationships between those actors be developed. This policy analysis
identified policy actors both from within the European and domestic policy making arenas.
At a national level within Government, the principal players were the Oireachtas and the
Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women‘s‘ Rights. The sub-government
level included the Department of Justice, the Attorney General and the Hederman Committee.
The latter is considered as sub-governmental given the composition of the members. The
non-governmental sources identified were the Human Rights Commission and the I.C.C.L.
who both fulfil advocacy roles. The European policy making landscape was dominated by
the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, C.O.R.E.P.E.R., C.A.T.S.
and its technical working groups. Framework decisions, despite necessitating unanimity,
impose political obligations upon national governments.

Therefore, those European

institutions were the dominant policy makers who formulated the new terrorist definitions.
5.1.2 The Problem Stream
Historically, the problem of domestic terrorism dominated policy making in the Department
of Justice (Walsh: 1998).

Subsequent to the Good Friday agreement, the Hederman

Committee assessed whether persistent threats justified the continuation of existing antiterrorist legislation (2002). Ironically, when the Hederman report was published (2002) the
problem of domestic terrorism remained but the concern about international terrorism was
increasing which informed their recommendation that existing legislation be amended to
enable suppression of international terrorist groups. Insightfully, they noted the definitional
difficulties it would present.
At the same time the consequences of a globalised world were emerging as a problem to be
overcome when attempting to control terrorist threats. Open economies enabled terrorists to
transcend national criminal justice systems.
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This ‗problem‘ had been identified by the

European Parliament on the 5 September 2001. In the preamble to the Commission proposal
(2001) it observes that the European Parliament had adopted a resolution asking the Council
to make decisions that facilitate easier extradition arrangements and to agree ‗the constituent
elements and penalties in the field of terrorism’ (Commission Proposal: 2001:5). Six days
later, a ‗signal event‘, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 emphasised the urgency of
reaching agreement on such proposals (Mulcahy: 2006).
5.1.3 The Political Stream
The day after September 11, 2001, the political reaction to the bombings began with the
United Nations adopting resolution 1373 urging countries to enact outstanding anti-terrorist
conventions. Ireland not implemented five such conventions, two of which dated from the
1970‘s. Kingdon (1995) identifies the ‗political stream‘ as capturing the public mood which,
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, had heightened fears about Islamic terrorism. The
Framework Decision unusually obliged the establishment of common definitions of terrorism
(2002) and politically bound Member States, thus elevating the significance of the political
stream in this analysis. The purpose behind Framework Decisions is to achieve political
agreement, at European Level, on policies of common concern, such that by their very nature
they emphasise the importance of the political stream to the policy making process.
5.1.4 The Policy Stream
Solomon (1981) observed that political institutions are very influential in policy formation. In
this analysis, European administrative institutions were particularly prominent.

Weiler

(1999:98) observed that EU policy making is dominated by ‗middle–range officials of the
community and the member states in combination with a variety of private or semi-public
bodies‘ which Schmitter (1996:133) has called ‗comitology‘. This resonates in this study as
whilst the European Parliament identified the ‗problem‘ it was European administrative
institutions who ultimately proposed, prepared and refined common definitions on terrorism
to enable political agreement. Fairchild (1981) observed that policies are often developed by
influential legislators or administrators but noted that politicians prefer consensus policy
making. The Council of Ministers, comprising of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs, are
influential legislators within the European Union, a role that is considerably enabled by the
political administrative structures built to facilitate consensus policy making.

Limited

information about this European policy making environment was available from the
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Department of Justice. Some insight was gleamed from information provided by Minister
McDowell to the Joint Committee on Justice (2003). The true nature of working practices,
relationship networks, dependencies or interdependences within those groups and committees
was not ascertainable from the information sources.
The proposal for a framework decision was presented to the Oireachtas for adoption on the
evening of the 12 December 2001, with limited time for debate. The document furnished to
the Oireachtas was incomplete and legislators were advised that ‗textual corrections’ would
be ‗tidied up by the Council Secretariat’. (Seanad Debates: 2001: Vol. 168 No. 23). The draft
Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism (2002) was prepared with those ‗textual
corrections‘ to be amended by European Administrative structures. Therefore, whilst a
problem stream was identified by the Hederman Committee at national level and by the
European Parliament, it was only when it became urgent within the political stream that the
policy stream flourished, primarily at European level. The policy window opened by the
terrorist bombings in the U.S.A enabled policy agreement at international political level.
Common definitions were agreed in substance before the Irish Oireachtas entered the process.
Therefore, the policy stream within which the Oireachtas subsequently became involved was
limited to mediating the degree to which policy convergence, brought about by coercion,
would penetrate in Ireland.
5.1.5 Policy Convergence
Irish policy makers may not have initiated the policy but did influence the local
implementation. Bennett (1991) described how harmonisation of policies can be achieved by
international governmental structures promoting particular policies such that countries move
towards an agreed policy. Whilst the third pillar adopted the language of ‗harmonisation‘ this
policy took the form of coercion. The European Commission acknowledged this unusual
compulsion which was further enforced by the subsequent monitoring of implementation by
the European Commission. Bennett (1991), however, cautions researchers to look below the
surface when determining whether convergence has actually occurred. He advises assessing
the policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes and policy style before
determining the extent of convergence.

The ‗policy goal‘ of limiting opportunities for

terrorists to transcend borders and evade justice is translated in the legislation. The Act is the
policy instrument through which ‗policy content‘ is to be assessed and it mirrors those
definitions as to terrorist groups and the ‗mens rea‘ provision. Thereafter definitions are

51

accommodated within the legislative environment into which they have been transposed.
Therefore, there is divergence in the ‗policy content‘ as the sentencing model adopted by
Ireland only minimally increases existing penalty provisions and does not impose non
criminal fines or additional sanctions proposed in the Framework Decision. Neither did
Ireland provide for special assistance to be given to victims of terrorism.
As this study is limited in scope, it does not allow for the assessment of ‗policy outcomes‘ as
advised by Bennett (1991). The role to be played by the Judiciary in interpreting the statute
and thereby mediating its implementation has yet to be seen (Jones & Newburn 2006). It is
noteworthy that there has not been a prosecution for a terrorist offence contrary to section 6
of the Act in 2007, 2008 or 2009 (Annual Report of the Office of the D.P.P:2010). Despite
being unable to reach a conclusion about the extent of policy convergence in Ireland, the
analysis did assist in understanding whether theoretical perspectives of control or risk
underpin these new terrorist definitions.
5.2

Crime Control and Crime Complex Perspectives

5.2.1 Crime Control Model
The crime control model of justice devised by Packer (1968) promoted the elimination of
barriers to a successful prosecution. As outlined in the literature review, characteristics
include evidential presumptions and inferences which assist in easing the evidential burden.
Terrorist offences cannot be committed without the necessary intent but that intent can be
presumed from circumstances described in the Act, thus easing the prosecutorial path through
any political arguments that acts were committed to further a political cause.
In addition, these ‗terrorist groups‘ are now members of unlawful organisations such that
evidential provisions which apply to prosecutions contrary to section 21 of the Offences
Against the State Act 1939 will apply. The evidence of a chief superintendent as to his/her
belief that an accused is a member of a terrorist group will be admissible which assists the
prosecution given the nebulous definition of a terrorist group. The lack of specificity in the
definition can be overcome when such garda evidence is admitted. The loose definition of
terrorist groups, defined as ‗a structured group of more than two persons established over a
period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offence’, facilitates the prosecution of
groupings where only suspicion exists as to their motives. The prosecution of such nebulous
groupings is unhindered by a necessity to suppress a named organisation with identifiable
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goals.

The concern expressed by Kilcommins et al (2004) about the normalisation of

extraordinary powers is pertinent given the ministerial comments made when the initial
Proposal for a Framework Decision was introduced to the Dáil. Minister O‘Donoghue
(2001:4) mused that our existing legislation was ‗more comprehensive than the provisions in
the proposal’. Therefore, crime control trends are evident in the terrorist definitions within
the Act.
5.2.2 Crime Complex
Garland (2001) linked the politicisation of crime to increased crime rates and limited ability
of governments to control crime. The politics of this phenomenon requires regular political
signals of control. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 sent shock waves through
international politics. The chameleon nature of international terrorism limits the capacity of
national governments to control its threat. The Framework Decision could be interpreted as a
signal of control by European Member States, especially in an Irish context where it was
observed by our Minister that ‘our existing legislation in this regard is more comprehensive
than the proposal’ (2001:4). The wide definitions of ‗terrorist offence‘, which allows for the
prosecution of offences committed outside the European Union, presented a dilemma to
politicians as prosecutions could be brought by the D.P.P. which conflict with Ireland‘s
international diplomatic relations. Therefore, a power is reserved to the Attorney General to
prevent the further prosecution of an accused person charged with a terrorist offence
committed outside the European Union. Minister McDowell confirmed that this imperfect
compromise represented political policy ‘with a small ‘p’ (Select Committee: 3/11/2004).
Framework decisions by their nature are politically binding but not legally binding.
However, this Framework Decision differed by politically imposing precise legal definitions
upon Ireland. The debates reveal that the political nature of this agreement surpasses any
domestic challenges to those definitions, with the Minister acknowledging the definitional
deficits but saying we have to insert those definitions as ‘that is how the Europeans decided
it’. Equally, as noted by Minister O‘Donoghue, Ireland has a terrorist history such that our
statute book already accommodates offences for possession of firearms, possession of
explosives, false imprisonment, making menacing demands, and offences of treason. The
Framework Decision determined that these statutory provisions were insufficient. However,
implementation in this Act involved simply the renaming of existing Irish offences as
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terrorist offences or ‗terrorist–linked offences‘ but with increased penalties. These factors, it
is submitted, suggest a trend towards the politicisation of crime in the area of terrorism.
Garland (2001) believed that incapacitation emerges from a crime complex as the principal
aim of sentencing. Part 2 of the Act increases only minimally penalties for existing offences
which if committed with the requisite intent become terrorist offences. The changes made to
the penalty provisions between presentation of the Bill and passing of the Act are significant.
The Minister acknowledges that he took note of advice from the Human Rights Commission
that the penalties were disproportionate, given that Ireland operates a sentencing policy
whereby sentences are proportionate to both the circumstances of the offence and the
accused. Equally relevant was the need to allow for judicial discretion, long a feature of Irish
sentencing policy. Another feature of the crime complex was the prominence given to
victims in criminal justice policy making. The Framework Decision was agreed in the wake
of ‗a signal event‘ (Mulcahy: 2006), events which De Londras notes can increase concerns
about the risk of victimhood (2011). Security decisions made by the Council of Ministers
have been described as ‗event led, disjointed incrementalism‘ (De Boer and Wallace
(2001:514). The Irish Government did not however implement specific victim provisions as
contained in the Framework Decision. The reasons why they did not do so are not explained
within the documentation retrieved. Consequently the proposition by Kilcommins et al (2004)
that victims do not direct criminal justice policies in Ireland has some support. Therefore, it
cannot be said that penalty provisions reflect a policy of incapacitation or that victims dictate
the direction of policies. Therefore, some essential features of the crime complex are
noticeably absent. There is however evidence of increasing politicisation of crime at a supranational level, as governments announce their policies for containing the risks inherent in the
global nature of terrorism.
5.3

Risk and Actuarial Justice Perspectives

5.3.1 Risk Strategies
The question of whether anti-terrorist policies, announced in this legislation, represent an
attempt to employ risk strategies upon terrorists‘ falls to be considered. The literature review
described the elements of such strategies as involving the surveillance, management and
control of risks posed by terrorism. These policies proceed on the assumption that everyone
may offend but can be deterred when the risk of detection is too high. However, definitions
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within the Act are too imprecisely worded to target an identifiable group with any deliberate
policy of containment. Whilst, evidence of risk strategies are not found in terrorist related
definitions, they are reflected in initiatives introduced to suppress the funding of terrorism
and by the creation of an offence of rendering assistance to unlawful organisations. The
Minister said that this offence was necessary to limit the activities of persons closely
associated with unlawful organisation but against whom ‗it cannot be proven’ that they are
members of an unlawful organisation (Dáil debates:2003 Vol. 560. No. 3). Equally Minister
Hanafin said that Act was needed to ‗not only to choke terrorist groups of funds, we must also
starve them of volunteers’ (Dáil Debates: Vol.560 No.4).

Therefore, whilst the central

definitions are not dominated by risk some policies aimed at curtailing the necessary support
to maintain terrorism do resemble risk strategies.
5.3.2 Actuarial Justice
The premise upon which actuarial justice proceeds is that the offender is irredeemable such
that deterrent strategies will fail. Actuarial policies include the imposition of curfews, control
orders or post release reporting obligations. It cannot be argued that actuarial policies have
influenced the formulation of these new terrorist definitions as the definitions and penalty
provisions in the Act still encompass the aim to deter. Beyond the political rhetoric, there is
no evidence of the creation of ‗others‘.

The structural definition of ‗terrorist groups‘

corresponds with organised criminal gangs. This nebulous definition lacking any specificity,
departing from the practice of identifying named groups to be suppressed by Parliament, may
appear to depart from deterrent principles.

Equally, political comments by Minister

O‘Donoghue (2001) who described September 11, 2001 as demonstrating the ‘choice
between good and evil (Dail Debates: Vol.168 No. 23) might bolster such a proposition.
Unlike other jurisdictions, however, this legislation still proposes to utilise the criminal
justice system to prosecute accused persons with the existing safeguards including the right to
bail, limited detention and the prosecution bearing the legal burden of proof remaining
unaltered. The Act does not introduce civil procedures of containment of individuals based
upon shaky platforms of evidence. The maximum penalties provided do not suggest that
incapacitation is the main objective. Proportionate sentences will still be imposed by the
Judiciary in accordance with established just desserts objectives. Therefore, upon closer
examination any perceived policy of exclusion and control of ‗others‘ in society does not
penetrate below the political rhetoric. Consequently, perspectives on risk do not dominate
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the definitions of terrorism set out in part 2 of the Act so that it cannot be argued that this has
led to the creation of ‗others‘ within society. However, there are still aspects of Beck‘s risk
society that merit examination.
5.3.3 Political Dynamism in the Risk Society
It is evident from the reports from the I.I.D.C. and the I.M.C. that paramilitary activity
persisted at the start of the last decade. At this time the Hederman Report (2002) concluded
that domestic terrorist threats remained with emergent terrorist threats abroad and they
recommended that Irish legislation be ‗amended‘ to enable the suppression of international
terrorist groups.

Despite the concerns about international terrorism expressed by the

Hederman Committee, the Garda Commissioner conceded that he did not believe that Ireland
faced any immediate threat from International terrorism (Select Committee:17/12/2002).
Despite commissioning the Hederman Committee report, the Oireachtas was not afforded an
opportunity to create terrorist definitions appropriate to our own unique cultural, legal and
political landscape.

The intervention of what Beck has called supra-national political

dynamism (Beck:1997) usurped national governments by imposing definitions.

The

European Commission noted that this Framework Decision differed from others that did not
impose specific defined offences upon Member States.

Therefore, the process of

approximation commenced under Article 34 of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) was perceived
as an inadequate vehicle to entrust with the formulation of a common anti-terrorist policy.
The extra- territorial provisions provide a further example of the impact of globalisation. The
illusive global terrorist is often unhindered by the burden of citizenship, a factor that
increases his/her chances of proceeding unchallenged. This risk had to be curtailed so the
Framework Decision required Member States to extend their criminal jurisdiction to
criminalise acts committed in another country by their residents. Terrorism does expose the
European Union to incalculable risks, more difficult to identify or isolate, which had led to
political dynamism emanating from the need to contain and manage those risks. Minister Mc
Dowell‘s comment that Ireland cannot ‗opt out of the global reality’ is particularly apt (Dáil
Debates 2004: Vol. 595 No 2).
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CHAPTER 6
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The problem of terrorism was already first identified by the European Parliament as a
problem which facilitated the promotion of the proposal for a framework decision. The
political pressure wrought upon globalised economies, perceived weak by terrorism, required
political action, if only rhetoric.

The policy convergence achieved by the Framework

Decision was coerced but the level of the policy impact is beyond the examination of this
study.

Therefore, it remains to be assessed whether there has been complete policy

convergence in Ireland. No prosecution for a terrorist offence in the Act has been taken
(D.P.P:2010). Whilst the Act was conceived from the political necessity to appear in control
of terrorist threats in the wake of September 11, 2001, it cannot be said that the Act is
symptomatic of a crime complex as other elements indicative of a crime complex remain
absent.
The continuation of extant domestic terrorist legislation was endorsed by the Hederman
Committee given the persistent paramilitary activity. Theoretically, the extraordinary, now
normalised powers, applicable in the prosecution of domestic terrorism have been extended
to ‗terrorist groups‘ of an unorganised kind, origins unknown.

Consequently, such

investigative and evidential provisions facilitate the successful prosecution of offenders and
are indicative of a trend towards a crime control model of justice. However, the antiterrorism policy does not appear dominated by risk strategies. There remains a commitment
to deterrent based strategies when prosecuting terrorist offences. Beyond the prosecutorial
path, risk based strategies are evident in the attempt to control the funds available to terrorist
organisation. Risk strategies have not developed to the extent that incapacitation has primacy
or has led has the creation of ‗others‘ excluded from normal society. However, the existence
of globalised risks, synonymous with the risk society, has led to increased political
dynamism. The failure of actuarial policies to penetrate is perhaps influenced by our unique
cultural, judicial and political history.
Further study on the policy outcome would be beneficial as it would reveal the degree to
which policy convergence penetrates nationally. The research revealed the powerful
influence of unelected supra national bodies on our criminal legislation and this will increase
given that the Lisbon Treaty (2009) allows for majority decision making. To prevent the
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emerging crime control model venturing towards a crime complex, non-governmental
organisations should organise on a supra national basis to moderate those excesses.
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APPENDIX 1
Part 2 of Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005
PART 2

Suppression of Terrorist Groups and Terrorist Offences

Definitions for Part 2.

4.—In this Part—
―Framework Decision‖ means the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism adopted
by the Council of the European Union at Luxembourg on 13 June 2002, the text of which
is set out for convenience of reference in—
(a) Part 1 of Schedule 1, in the case of the Irish language text, and
(b) Part 2 of Schedule 1, in the case of the English language text
―terrorist activity‖ means an act that is committed in or outside the State and that
(a) if committed in the State, would constitute an offence specified in Part 1 of
Schedule 2 , and
(b) is committed with the intention of—
(i) seriously intimidating a population,
(ii) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to
perform or abstain from performing an act, or
(iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a state or an international
organisation;
―terrorist group‖ has the same meaning as in the Framework Decision;
―terrorist-linked activity‖ means an act—
(a) that is committed in or outside the State and that—
(i) if committed in the State, would constitute an offence specified in
Part 2 of Schedule 2 , and
(ii) is committed with a view to engaging in a terrorist activity,
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or
(b) that is committed in or outside the State and that—
(i) if committed in the State, would constitute an offence specified in
Part 3 of Schedule 2 , and
(ii) is committed with a view to engaging in a terrorist activity or with
a view to committing an act that, if committed in the State, would
constitute an offence under section 21 or 21A of the Act of 1939
Terrorist groups.
5.—(1) A terrorist group that engages in, promotes, encourages or advocates the
commission, in or outside the State, of a terrorist activity is an unlawful organisation
within the meaning and for the purposes of the Offences against the State Acts 1939 to
1998 and section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1976
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the Offences against the State Acts 1939 to 1998 and
section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1976 apply with any necessary modifications and have
effect in relation to a terrorist group referred to in subsection (1) as if that group were an
organisation referred to in section 18 of the Act of 1939.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are not to be taken to be limited by any other provision of this
Act that refers to provisions of the Offences against the State Acts 1939 to 1998 or that
makes provisions of those Acts applicable in relation to offences under this Act.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply whether the terrorist group is based in or outside the
State.

Terrorist offences.

6.—(1) Subject to subsections (2) to (4), a person is guilty of an offence if the person—
(a) in or outside the State—
(i) engages in a terrorist activity or a terrorist-linked activity,
(ii) attempts to engage in a terrorist activity or a terrorist-linked
activity, or
(iii) makes a threat to engage in a terrorist activity,
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Or
(b) commits outside the State an act that, if committed in the State, would
constitute—
(i) an offence under section 21 or 21A of the Act of 1939, or
(ii) an offence under section 6 of the Act of 1998.

(2) Subsection (1) applies to an act committed outside the State if the act—
(a) is committed on board an Irish ship,
(b) is committed on an aircraft registered in the State,
(c) is committed by a person who is a citizen of Ireland or is resident in the
State,
(d) is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in the State,
(e) is directed against the State or an Irish citizen, or
(f) is directed against—
(i) an institution of the European Union that is based in the State, or
(ii) a body that is based in the State and is set up in accordance with the
Treaty establishing the European Community or the Treaty on
European Union.

(3) Subsection (1) applies also to an act committed outside the State in circumstances
other than those referred to in subsection (2), but in that case the Director of Public
Prosecutions may not take, or consent to the taking of, proceedings referred to in section
43 (2) for an offence in respect of that act except as authorised by section 43 (3).

(4) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of—
(a) the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict insofar as those activities
are governed by international humanitarian law, or
(b) the activities of the armed forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties
insofar as those activities are governed by other rules of international law.

(5) To avoid doubt, the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent, or
engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not of itself a sufficient basis
for inferring that the person is carrying out an act with the intention specified in
paragraph (b) of the definition of ―terrorist activity‖ in section 4 .
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(6) Where a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1), which in the opinion
of the Attorney General was committed in or outside the State with the intention of—

(a) unduly compelling the government of a state (other than a member state of the
European Union) to perform or abstain from performing an act, or

(b) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional,
economic or social structures of such a state,

then, notwithstanding anything in this Act, no further proceedings in the matter (other
than any remand in custody or on bail) may be taken except with the consent of the
Attorney General.

(7) Where in proceedings for the offence of engaging in or attempting to engage in a
terrorist activity—
(a) it is proved that the accused person committed or attempted to commit an act—
(i) that constitutes an offence specified in Part 1 of Schedule 2 , or
(ii) that, if committed in the State, would constitute an offence referred to in
subparagraph (i),
And
(b) the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances including those
specified in subsection (8), that it is reasonable to assume that the act was committed,
or the attempt was made, with the intention of—
(i) seriously intimidating a population,
(ii) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to
perform or abstain from performing an act, or
(iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a state or an international
organisation,
the accused person shall be presumed, unless the court is satisfied to the contrary, to
have committed or attempted to commit the act with that intention.

(8) The circumstances referred to in subsection (7), include—
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(a) whether the act or attempt referred to in subsection (7)(a)—
(i) created or was likely to create a collective danger to the lives or physical
integrity of persons,
(ii) caused or was likely to cause serious damage to a state or international
organisation, or
(iii) caused or was likely to result in major economic loss,
And
(b) any other matters that the court considers relevant.

(9) Where the Director of Public Prosecutions considers that another Member State of the
European Communities has jurisdiction to try a person for any act constituting an offence
under this section, the Director—
(a) shall co-operate with the appropriate authority in that other Member State, and
(b) may have recourse to any body or mechanism established within the European
Communities in order to facilitate co-operation between judicial authorities,
with a view to centralising the prosecution of the person in a single Member State
where possible.

Penalties for terrorist offences.
7.—(1) A person guilty of an offence under section 6 (1)(a) is liable on conviction to be
punished according to the gravity of the offence as follows:
(a) to the sentence of imprisonment fixed by law, if the corresponding offence
specified in Schedule 2 is one for which the sentence is fixed by law;
(b) to imprisonment for life, if the corresponding offence specified in Schedule
2 is one for which the maximum sentence is imprisonment for life;
(c) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years more than the maximum
term of imprisonment for the corresponding offence specified in Schedule 2 ,
if that corresponding offence is one for which a person of full capacity and not
previously convicted may be sentenced to a maximum term of 10 or more
years of imprisonment;
(d) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year more than the maximum
term of imprisonment for the corresponding offence specified in Schedule 2 ,
if that corresponding offence is one for which a person of full capacity and not
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previously convicted may be sentenced to a maximum term of less than 10
years of imprisonment.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under section 6 (1)(b) is liable on conviction to the
penalty to which he or she would have been liable had the act that constitutes the offence
been done in the State.
(3) In this section, ―corresponding offence‖, in relation to a person convicted of an
offence under section 6 (1)(a), means the offence for which the person would have been
liable to be convicted had the act constituting the offence under that section been
committed in the State in the absence of the intent referred to in paragraph (b) of the
definition in section 4 of ―terrorist activity‖.

70

APPENDIX 11

22.6.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 164/3

(Acts adopted pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union)

COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION
of 13 June 2002
on combating terrorism

Official Journal L 164 , 22/06/2002 P. 0003 - 0007
(2002/475/JHA)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

(3)

All or some Member States are party to a
number of conventions relating to
terrorism. The Council of Europe
Convention of 27 January 1977 on the
Suppression of Terrorism does not regard
terrorist offences as political offences or
as offences connected with political
offences or as offences inspired by
political motives. The United Nations has
adopted the Convention for the
suppression of terrorist bombings of 15
December 1997 and the Convention for
the suppression of financing terrorism of
9 December 1999. A draft global
Convention against terrorism is currently
being negotiated within the United
Nations.

(4)

At European Union level, on 3 December
1998 the Council adopted the Action
Plan of the Council and the Commission
on how best to implement the provisions
of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of
freedom, security and justice( 3). Account
should also be taken of the Council
Conclusions of 20 September 2001 and
of the Extraordinary European Council
plan of action to combat terrorism of 21
September 2001. Terrorism was referred
to in the conclusions of the Tampere
European Council of 15 and 16 October
1999, and of the Santa María da Feira
European Council of 19 and 20 June

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the
European Union, and in particular Article 29,
Article 31(e) and Article 34(2)(b) thereof,
Having regard
Commission(1),

to

the

proposal

from

the

Having regard to the opinion of the European
Parliament(2),
Whereas:
(1)

(2)

1
2

The European Union is founded on the
universal values of human dignity,
liberty, equality and solidarity, respect
for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. It is based on the principle of
democracy and the principle of the rule
of law, principles which are common to
the Member States.
Terrorism constitutes one of the most
serious violations of those principles. The
La Gomera Declaration adopted at the
informal Council meeting on 14 October
1995 affirmed that terrorism constitutes a
threat to democracy, to the free exercise
of human rights and to economic and
social development.
OJ C 332 E, 27.11.2001, P. 300.
Opinion delivered on 6 February 2002
(not yet published in the Official Journal).

3
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OJ C 19, 23.1.1999, p. 1.

2000. It was also mentioned in the
Commission communication to the
Council and the European Parliament on
the biannual update of the scoreboard to
review progress on the creation of an
area of "freedom, security and justice" in
the European Union (second half of
2000). Furthermore, on 5 September
2001 the European Parliament adopted a
recommendation on the role of the
European Union in combating terrorism.
It should, moreover, be recalled that on
30 July 1996 twenty-five measures to
fight against terrorism were advocated by
the leading industrialised countries (G7)
and Russia meeting in Paris.
(5)

(6)

4
5
6
7
8

offences, which reflect the seriousness of
such offences.

The European Union has adopted
numerous specific measures having an
impact on terrorism and organised crime,
such as the Council Decision of 3
December 1998 instructing Europol to
deal with crimes committed or likely to
be committed in the course of terrorist
activities against life, limb, personal
freedom or property( 4); Council Joint
Action 96/610/JHA of 15 October 1996
concerning the creation and maintenance
of a Directory of specialised counterterrorist
competences,
skills
and
expertise to facilitate counter-terrorism
cooperation between the Member States
of the European Union( 5); Council Joint
Action 98/428/JHA of 29 June 1998 on
the creation of a European Judicial
Network(6), with responsibilities in
terrorist offences, in particular Article 2;
Council Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21
December 1998 on making it a criminal
offence to participate in a criminal
organisation in the Member States of the
European Union(7); and the Council
Recommendation of 9 December 1999
on cooperation in combating the
financing of terrorist groups(8).
The definition of terrorist offences
should be approximated in all Member
States, including those offences relating
to terrorist groups. Furthermore, penalties
and sanctions should be provided for
natural and legal persons having
committed or being liable for such

OJ C 26, 30.1.1999, p. 22.
OJ L 273, 25.10.1996, p. 1.
OJ L 191, 7.7.1998, p.4.
OJ L 351, 29.12.1998, p. 1.
OJ C 373, 23.12.1999, p. 1.

(7)

Jurisdictional rules should be established
to ensure that the terrorist offence may be
effectively prosecuted.

(8)

Victims of terrorist offences are
vulnerable, and therefore specific
measures are necessary with regard to
them.

(9)

Given that the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States unilaterally, and can
therefore, because of the need for
reciprocity, be better achieved at the
level of the Union, the Union may adopt
measures, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity.In accordance
with the principle of proportionality, this
Framework Decision does not go beyond
what is necessary in order to achieve
those objectives.

(10)

This Framework Decision respects
fundamental rights as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and as they emerge from the
constitutional traditions common to the
Member States as principles of
Community law. The Union observes the
principles recognised by Article 6(2) of
the Treaty on European Union and
reflected in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, notably
Chapter VI thereof. Nothing in this
Framework Decision may be interpreted
as being intended to reduce or restrict
fundamental rights or freedoms such as
the right to strike, freedom of assembly,
of association or of expression, including
the right of everyone to form and to join
trade unions with others for the
protection of his or her interests and the
related right to demonstrate.

(11)

Actions by armed forces during periods
of armed conflict, which are governed by
international humanitarian law within the
meaning of these terms under that law,
and, inasmuch as they are governed by
other rules of international law, actions
by the armed forces of a State in the
exercise of their official duties are not
governed by this Framework Decision,

HAS
ADOPTED
DECISION:
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THIS

FRAMEWORK

Article 1

fundamental natural resource the effect
of which is to endanger human life;

Terrorist offences and fundamental rights and
principles

(i) threatening to commit any of the acts
listed in (a) to (h).

1.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that the intentional
acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as
defined as offences under national law, which,
given their nature or context, may seriously
damage a country or an international organisation
where committed with the aim of:
-

seriously intimidating a population, or

-

unduly compelling a Government or
international organisation to perform or
abstain from performing any act, or

2.
This Framework Decision shall not have
the effect of altering the obligation to respect
fundamental rights and fundamental legal
principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty
on European Union.

Article 2

-

Offences relating to a terrorist group
1.
For the purposes of this Framework
Decision, "terrorist group" shall mean: a
structured group of more than two persons,
established over a period of time and acting in
concert to commit terrorist offences. "Structured
group" shall mean a group that is not randomly
formed for the immediate commission of an
offence and that does not need to have formally
defined roles for its members, continuity of its
membership or a developed structure.

seriously destabilising or destroying the
fundamental political, constitutional,
economic or social structures of a
country or an international organisation,

shall be deemed to be terrorist offences:
(a) attacks upon a person's life which
may cause death;

2.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that the following
intentional acts are punishable:

(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of
a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a
Government or public facility, a transport
system, an infrastructure facility,
including an information system, a fixed
platform located on the continental shelf,
a public place or private property likely
to endanger human life or result in major
economic loss;

(a)

directing a terrorist group;

(b)

participating in the activities of a terrorist
group, including by supplying
information or material resources, or by
funding its activities in any way, with
knowledge of the fact that such
participation will contribute to the
criminal activities of the terrorist group.

(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other
means of public or goods transport;
Article 3
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition,
transport, supply or use of weapons,
explosives or of nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons, as well as research
into, and development of, biological and
chemical weapons;

Offences linked to terrorist activities
Each Member State shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offences
include the following acts:

(g) release of dangerous substances, or
causing fires, floods or explosions the
effect of which is to endanger human
life;
(h) interfering with or disrupting the
supply of water, power or any other
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(a)

aggravated theft with a view to
committing one of the acts listed in
Article 1(1);

(b)

extortion with a view to the perpetration
of one of the acts listed in Article 1(1);

(c)

drawing up false administrative
documents with a view to committing
one of the acts listed in Article 1(1)(a) to
(h) and Article 2(2)(b).

Article 6
Particular circumstances
Each Member State may take the necessary
measures to ensure that the penalties referred to in
Article 5 may be reduced if the offender:

Article 4
(a)

renounces terrorist activity, and

(b)

provides the administrative or judicial
authorities with information which they
would not otherwise have been able to
obtain, helping them to:

Inciting, aiding or abetting, and attempting
1.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that inciting or
aiding or abetting an offence referred to in Article
1(1), Articles 2 or 3 is made punishable.

(i) prevent or mitigate the effects of the
offence;

2.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that attempting to
commit an offence referred to in Article 1(1) and
Article 3, with the exception of possession as
provided for in Article 1(1)(f) and the offence
referred to in Article 1(1)(i), is made punishable.

(ii) identify or bring to justice the other
offenders;
(iii) find evidence; or
(iv) prevent further offences referred to
in Articles 1 to 4.

Article 5
Penalties
Article 7
1.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that the offences
referred to in Articles 1 to 4 are punishable by
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal
penalties, which may entail extradition.

Liability of legal persons
1.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that legal persons
can be held liable for any of the offences referred
to in Articles 1 to 4 committed for their benefit by
any person, acting either individually or as part of
an organ of the legal person, who has a leading
position within the legal person, based on one of
the following:

2.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that the terrorist
offences referred to in Article 1(1) and offences
referred to in Article 4, inasmuch as they relate to
terrorist offences, are punishable by custodial
sentences heavier than those imposable under
national law for such offences in the absence of
the special intent required pursuant to Article 1(1),
save where the sentences imposable are already
the maximum possible sentences under national
law.
3.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that offences listed
in Article 2 are punishable by custodial sentences,
with a maximum sentence of not less than fifteen
years for the offence referred to in Article 2(2)(a),
and for the offences listed in Article 2(2)(b) a
maximum sentence of not less than eight years. In
so far as the offence referred to in Article 2(2)(a)
refers only to the act in Article 1(1)(i), the
maximum sentence shall not be less than eight
years.

(a)

a power of representation of the legal
person;

(b)

an authority to take decisions on behalf
of the legal person;

(c)

an authority to exercise control within the
legal person.

2.
Apart from the cases provided for in
paragraph 1, each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that legal persons
can be held liable where the lack of supervision or
control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has
made possible the commission of any of the
offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 for the
benefit of that legal person by a person under its
authority.
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3.
Liability of legal persons under paragraphs
1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings
against natural persons who are perpetrators,
instigators or accessories in any of the offences
referred to in Articles 1 to 4.

(d)

the offence is committed for the benefit
of a legal person established in its
territory;

(e)

the offence is committed against the
institutions or people of the Member
State in question or against an institution
of the European Union or a body set up
in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community or
the Treaty on European Union and based
in that Member State.

Article 8
Penalties for legal persons
Each Member State shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that a legal person held liable
pursuant to Article 7 is punishable by effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which shall
include criminal or non-criminal fines and may
include other penalties, such as:
(a)

exclusion from entitlement to public
benefits or aid;

(b)

temporary or permanent disqualification
from the practice of commercial
activities;

(c)

placing under judicial supervision;

2.
When an offence falls within the
jurisdiction of more than one Member State and
when any of the States concerned can validly
prosecute on the basis of the same facts, the
Member States concerned shall cooperate in order
to decide which of them will prosecute the
offenders with the aim, if possible, of centralising
proceedings in a single Member State. To this end,
the Member States may have recourse to any body
or mechanism established within the European
Union in order to facilitate cooperation between
their judicial authorities and the coordination of
their action. Sequential account shall be taken of
the following factors:

(d)

a judicial winding-up order;

-

(e)

temporary or permanent closure of
establishments which have been used for
committing the offence.

the Member State shall be that in the
territory of which the acts were
committed,

-

the Member State shall be that of which
the perpetrator is a national or resident,

-

the Member State shall be the Member
State of origin of the victims,

-

the Member State shall be that in the
territory of which the perpetrator was
found.

Article 9
Jurisdiction and prosecution
1.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4
where:
(a)

the offence is committed in whole or in
part in its territory. Each Member State
may extend its jurisdiction if the offence
is committed in the territory of a Member
State;

(b)

the offence is committed on board a
vessel flying its flag or an aircraft
registered there;

(c)

the offender is one of its nationals or
residents;

3.
Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures also to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in
Articles 1 to 4 in cases where it refuses to hand
over or extradite a person suspected or convicted
of such an offence to another Member State or to a
third country.
4.
Each Member State shall ensure that its
jurisdiction covers cases in which any of the
offences referred to in Articles 2 and 4 has been
committed in whole or in part within its territory,
wherever the terrorist group is based or pursues its
criminal activities.
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5.
This Article shall not exclude the exercise
of jurisdiction in criminal matters as laid down by
a Member State in accordance with its national
legislation.

Article 12
Territorial application
This Framework Decision shall apply to Gibraltar.

Article 10
Article 13
Protection of, and assistance to, victims
Entry into force
1. Member States shall ensure that investigations
into, or prosecution of, offences covered by this
Framework Decision are not dependent on a
report or accusation made by a person subjected to
the offence, at least if the acts were committed on
the territory of the Member State.

This Framework Decision shall enter into force on
the day of its publication in the Official Journal.

Done at Luxembourg, 13 June 2002.

2.
In addition to the measures laid down in
the Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA
of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in
criminal proceedings(9), each Member State shall,
if necessary, take all measures possible to ensure
appropriate assistance for victims' families.
For the Council
The President
M. RAJOY BREY

Article 11
Implementation and reports

______________________________________

1.
Member States shall take the necessary
measures to comply with this Framework
Decision by 31 December 2002.
2.
By 31 December 2002, Member States
shall forward to the General Secretariat of the
Council and to the Commission the text of the
provisions transposing into their national law the
obligations imposed on them under this
Framework Decision. On the basis of a report
drawn up from that information and a report from
the Commission, the Council shall assess, by 31
December 2003, whether Member States have
taken the necessary measures to comply with this
Framework Decision.
3.
The Commission report shall specify, in
particular, transposition into the criminal law of
the Member States of the obligation referred to in
Article 5(2).

9

OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 1.
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APPENDIX III
Commission Proposal for a Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism (2001)

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 19.9.2001
COM(2001) 521 final
2001/0217 (CNS)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION
on combating terrorism

(presented by the Commission)

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to democracy, to the free exercise of
human rights and to economic and social development. Terrorism can never be justified,
whatever the target and the place where the offence is prepared or committed.
This has never been clearer than in the terrible aftermath of the unprecedented, tragic and
murderous terrorist attacks against the people of the United States of America on 11
September 2001. These cowardly attacks highlight the need for an effective response to
terrorism at the level of the European Union.
The European Union has set itself an objective in the Treaty on European Union to provide
citizens with a high level of safety within an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This
proposal, combined with the proposal to replace extradition within the European Union with
a European Arrest Warrant, is a key element of the Commission‘s contribution to achieving
this objective in the context of the fight against terrorism. It is vitally important that Member
States of the European Union have effective criminal laws in place to tackle terrorism, and
that measures are taken to enhance international co-operation against terrorism.
This proposal does not relate only to acts of terrorism directed at Member States. It also
applies to conduct on the territory of the European Union which can contribute to acts of
terrorism in third countries. This reflects the Commission‘s commitment to tackle terrorism
at a global as well as European Union level. Indeed, the Commission is working closely with
Member States and third countries to combat international terrorism within the framework of
international organisations and existing international co-operation mechanisms, particularly
the United Nations and the G8, with a view to ensuring the full implementation of all relevant
international instruments.
The European Union and its Member States are founded on respect for human rights,
fundamental freedoms, the guarantee of the dignity of the human being, and the protection of
the these rights, both as regards individuals and institutions. Furthermore, the right to life,
the right to physical integrity, the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of
thought, of expression and information are included in Articles 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11 of the
Charter of Fundamentals Right of the European Union1 (Nice, 7 December 2000).
Terrorism threatens these fundamental rights. There is hardly a country in Europe which has
not been affected, either directly or indirectly, by terrorism. Terrorist actions are liable to
undermine the rule of law and the fundamental principles on which the constitutional
traditions and legislation of Member States‘ democracies are based. They are committed
against one or more countries, their institutions or people with the aim of intimidating them
and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of those
countries.
Terrorism takes different forms, ranging from murder, through bodily harm and threats to
people's lives and kidnappings and on to destruction of property and damage to public or
private facilities. Terrorism causes suffering to the victims and those around them. It
1

OJ C 364, 18.12.2000,p.1.
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destroys their personal hopes and expectations and the material basis of their livelihood,
injuring them, inflicting psychological torture and causing death.
Terrorism has a long history behind it, but what makes modern-day terrorism particularly
dangerous is that, unlike terrorist acts in the past, the actual or potential impact of armed
attacks is increasingly devastating and lethal. This can result from the growing sophistication
and ruthless ambition of the terrorists themselves, as demonstrated most recently by the
horrific events in the United States on 11 September. Alternatively, it can result from
technological developments (and easy access to information about these developments),
whether in the traditional arms and explosives areas or in the even more terrifying fields of
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In addition, new forms of terrorism are emerging.
There have been several recent occasions where tensions in international relations have led to
a spate of attacks against information systems. More serious attacks could lead not only to
serious damage but even, in some cases, to loss of life.
The profound changes in the nature of terrorist offences highlight the inadequacy of
traditional forms of judicial and police cooperation in combating it. Increasingly, terrorism
stems from the activities of networks operating at international level, which are based in
several countries and exploit legal loopholes arising from the geographical limits of
investigations, sometimes enjoying extensive logistical and financial support. Given that
there are no borders within the European Union and that the right of free movements of
people is guaranteed, new measures in the fight against terrorism must be taken.
Terrorists might otherwise take advantage of any differences in legal treatment in the
different Member States. Today, more than ever, steps are needed to combat terrorism by
drawing up legislative proposals aimed at punishing such acts and strengthening police and
judicial cooperation.
The objective of this Communication is to reinforce criminal law measures to combat
terrorism. For that purpose, a proposal for a Framework Decision is submitted. Its objective is
the approximation of the laws of the Member States regarding terrorist offences in
accordance with Article 34(2)(b) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
2.

INTERNATIONAL AND EU LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

The first steps in the fight against terrorism were made under the auspices of the United
Nations, which promoted the Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on
board aircraft (Tokyo, 14-9-1963). After this Convention some other conventions and
protocols relating to terrorist acts were promulgated. The following are worth mentioning:
–

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft [Hijacking
Convention] (The Hague, 16-12-1970);

–

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Aircraft
(Montreal, 23-9-1971);

–

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (New York, 14-12-1973);

–

Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 17-12-1979);
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–

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (Vienna, 3-3-1980);

–

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving
International Aviation, complementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Aircraft (Montreal, 24-2-1988);

–

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (Rome, 10-3-1988);

–

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 10-3-1988);

–

UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 15-12-1997);

–

UN Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism (New York, 9-12-1999).

These two last Conventions are particularly important. Article 2 of the Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings provides that any person commits an offence if that
person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or
other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a
public transportation system or an infrastructure facility with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injuries; or with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place,
facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic
loss. The Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism states that is an offence to
provide or collect funds, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and intentionally, with the intent to
use them or knowing that they will be used to commit any act included within the scope of
the previously mentioned Conventions (apart from the Convention on offences and certain
other offences committed on board aircraft, which is not included). This means that, even
though in most of those conventions the words ―terrorism‖ or ―terrorist acts‖ are not
mentioned, they are related to terrorist offences .
However, with regard to existing international Conventions, the most significant effort in the
fight against terrorism, has been the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
(Strasbourg, 27-1-1977) under the mandate of the Council of Europe.2 This is the first
Convention in which terrorism is treated generically, at least in the sense that it gives a list of
terrorist acts. This convention does not consider this kind of offence as political offences, or
as offences connected with a political offence, or as offences inspired by political motives.
This is important for the purpose of the application of the conventions on extradition.
Articles 1 and 2 contain a list of offences considered to be terrorist acts. Article 1 refers to
offences within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (The Hague, 1970) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1971), which refer to certain terrorist acts.
Furthermore, offences involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of
internationally protected persons (including diplomatic agents), offences involving
kidnapping, taking of a hostage, serious unlawful detention, use of a bomb, grenade, rocket,
automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb, if this use endangers persons appear in the same
list. Article 2 extends the concept of terrorist act to other offences such as those which
2

STE n° 90.
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involve an act of violence, other than one covered by Article 1, against the life, physical
integrity or liberty of a person (paragraph 1); and against property if the act created a
collective danger for persons (paragraph 2).
Most of these conventions have been signed and ratified by the majority of Member States,
which means that they have to apply them. This proposal will facilitate the implementation
of those conventions as far as they concern penal law since they refer to the same issue:
terrorist offences.
At European Union level, Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union specifically refers to
terrorism as one of the serious forms of crime to be prevented and combated by developing
common action in three different ways: closer cooperation between police forces, customs
authorities and other competent authorities, including Europol; closer cooperation between
judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States; approximation, where
necessary, of rules on criminal matters.
Regarding police cooperation (Article 30 of the TEU), it is worth mentioning Article 2 (1) of
the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office, 3 in which terrorism is
included within its field of competence, and the Council Decision of 3 December 19984
instructing Europol to deal with crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of
terrorist activities against life, limb, personal freedom or property, which implements Article
2 (2) of that Convention. Furthermore, the Council Joint Action of 15 October 1996 5 decided
the creation and maintenance of a Directory of specialised counter-terrorism competences,
skills and expertise to facilitate counter-terrorism cooperation between the MS of the EU.
Concerning judicial cooperation Article 31 of the TUE states that common action on judicial
cooperation is to include facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent
ministries and judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to
proceedings and the enforcement of decisions (Paragraph A) and facilitating extradition
between Member States (Paragraph B). In this field there are two important legal
instruments: the Convention on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States
of the EU6 (10 March 1995) and the Convention relating to extradition between Member
States of the EU7 (27 September 1996), where Article 1 establishes that one of the purposes
of that Convention is to facilitate the application between the Member States of the EU of the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Furthermore, the Joint Action of 21
December 1998 on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in
the Member States of the EU8 refers to terrorist offences in Article 2 (2).
However, it seemed necessary to improve these legal instruments in order to fight against
terrorism in a more effective and efficient way. The conclusions of the Tampere European
Council9 meeting of 15 and 16 October 1999 therefore established that formal extradition
procedures should be abolished among the Member States as regards persons who are fleeing
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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from justice after having been finally sentenced, and replaced by a simple transfer of such
persons (Conclusion 35).
The European Parliament adopted (5 September 2001) a resolution concerning the role of the
EU in combating terrorism, calling on the Council to adopt a framework decision to abolish
formal extradition procedures, to adopt the principle of mutual recognition of decisions on
criminal matters including pre-judgement decisions in criminal matters relating to terrorist
offences and the implementation of the ―European search and arrest warrant‖, and to
approximate legislative provisions establishing minimum rules at European level relating to
the constituent elements and penalties in the field of terrorism.
Finally, regarding approximation of rules on criminal matters in the Member States, Article
31 (e)10 of the TEU calls for the adoption of measures establishing minimum rules relating to
the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the field of terrorism, which is
also mentioned in Paragraph 46 of the Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on
how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom,
security and justice11 (3 December 1998). This is the aim of this Framework Decision:
implementing Article 31 (e) of the TEU by approximating Member States‘ legislation
concerning terrorist offences .
Additionally to Title IV of the TEU establishing the appropriate instruments for the fighting
of terrorism at the Union‘s level and to coordinate action on an international level, the
Union‘s commitment to contribute towards the emergence of a strong, sustained and global
action against terrorism may require a political dialogue with or an action in relation to a
nonmember State as well as co-ordination of Member States in international organisations
and on international conferences. Without prejudice to the measures undertaken in the field
of police and judicial cooperation, the addressing of all security aspects may call for
complementary actions under, for example, the Common Foreign and Security Policy in
order to enhance impact and ensure consistency of the Union‘s external relations.
3.

MEMBER STATES LEGISLATION CONCERNING TERRORISM

In the European Union there are different situations in Member States in relation to
legislation related to terrorism. Some have no specific regulations on terrorism. In these
states, terrorist actions are punished as common offences. In other member States there are
specific laws or legal instruments concerning terrorism where the words ―terrorism‖ or
―terrorist‖ are expressly mentioned and where some terrorist offences are expressly typified.
This is the case in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Most terrorist acts are basically ordinary offences which become terrorist offences because of
the motivations of the offender. If the motivation is to alter seriously or to destroy the
fundamental principles and pillars of the state, intimidating people, there is a terrorist offence.
10

In this Article organised crime and illicit drug trafficking are also mentioned and the Union is dealing
with both of them. Concerning organised crime we should take into account the Joint Action 21
December 1998 on making it a criminal offences to participate in a criminal organisation in the MS of
the EU. Regarding illicit drug trafficking the Commission presented a proposal for a Council
Framework Decision laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and
penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking (COM (2001) 259 final, 23 May 2001).
11
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This point of view has been incorporated in Member States legislation concerning terrorism.
Although the wording is different, they are essentially synonymous with each other.
The Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure in Greece have been substantially
reshaped following the recent adoption of law no. 2928 of 27 June 2001. The French
Criminal Code12 refers to terrorist acts as those that can alter seriously public order through
threat or terror. The Portuguese Criminal Code13 mentions prejudice to national interests, to
alter or to disturb State‘s institutions, to force public authorities to do or not to do something,
and to threaten individuals or groups. The Spanish Criminal Code14, as in France and
Portugal, alludes to the aim of subverting the constitutional order and altering seriously
public peace. A similar statement, to subvert the democratic order, is also mentioned in the
Italian Criminal Code.15
The UK legislation, Terrorism Act 2000,16 is the largest piece of terrorist legislation in the
EU Member States. Terrorism is defined as meaning the use or threat of action where ―the
use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section
of the public‖ and ―the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious
or ideological cause‖; and that the action includes, among others, ―serious violence against a
person‖, ―serious damage to property‖ or ―creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the
public or a section of the public‖.
4.

A PROPOSAL FOR A FRAMEWORK DECISION

In view of Article 31 (e) of the TEU, the legal background previously mentioned, and the fact
that only six Member States have legal instruments covering terrorism, the present proposal
for a Framework Decision for the approximation of the substantive laws of the Member
States is clearly necessary. It concerns constituent elements and penalties in the field of
terrorism, ensuring that terrorist offences will be punished by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties. As a direct result, it will also facilitate police and judicial
cooperation, since common definitions of offences should overcome the obstacles of double
criminality requirement as long as it is a prerequisite for certain forms of judicial assistance.
Furthermore, the existence of a common framework in the fight against terrorism in the EU
will facilitate closer cooperation with third countries.
The key concept on which this proposal is based is the concept of a terrorist offence.
Terrorist offences can be defined as offences intentionally committed by an individual or a
group against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating
12

Art. 421-1 : « Constituent des acts de terrorism, lorsqu‘elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec
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pública… » .
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16
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them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a
country. The implication is that legal rights affected by this kind of offence are not the same
as legal rights affected by common offences. The reasoning here is that the motivation of the
offender is different, even though terrorist offences can usually be equated in terms of their
practical effect with ordinary criminal offences and, consequently, other legal rights are also
affected. In fact, terrorist acts usually damage the physical or psychological integrity of
individuals or groups, their property or their freedom, in the same way that ordinary offences
do, but terrorist offences go further in undermining the structures previously mentioned. 17
For this reason, terrorist offences and ordinary offences are different and affect different legal
rights. Therefore it seems appropriate to have different and specific constituent elements and
penalties for such particularly serious offences.
On the other hand, directing, creating, supporting or participating to a terrorist group must be
considered independent criminal acts and must be dealt with as terrorist offences. In order to
define the concept of a terrorist group we have to take into account the Joint Action of
21.12.1998 making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the
Member States of the European Union, where terrorism is expressly mentioned. Article 1
defines the criminal organisation as a structured association, established over a period of
time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing certain types of
offence, which are subject to the penalties specified in the mentioned article. Consequently,
and following that definition, we can say that a terrorist group is a structured organisation,
established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert to commit
terrorist acts.
This Framework Decision covers all terrorist offences prepared or committed within the
borders of the European Union, whatever their target, including terrorist acts against interests
of non EU Member States located in the EU.
Common definitions of offences and penalties are proposed. The proposal also contains
provisions on liability and penalties for legal persons, jurisdiction, victims and exchange of
information between Member States.
5.

LEGAL BASIS

Article 29 of the TEU establishes that the Union‘s objective shall be to provide citizens with
a level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action
among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation, and by preventing
and combating terrorism. The same Article provides for approximation, where necessary, of
rules on criminal matters in the Member States, in accordance with Article 31(e). This
Article states that common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include
progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent
elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the field, among other offences, of terrorism.
Article 34(2)(b) of the TEU refers to framework decisions as the instruments to be used for
the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. Framework
decisions are binding on the Member States as to the result to be achieved but leave to the
17

OJ L 351, 29.12.1998, p.1: ―Whereas the Council considers that the seriousness and development of
certain forms of organised crime require strengthening of cooperation between the MS of the EU, particularly as
regards the following offences: drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, terrorism…‖
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national authorities the choice of the form and methods. This proposal will not entail
financial implications for the budget of the European Community.

6.

THE FRAMEWORK DECISION: ARTICLES

Article 1 (Subject matter)
The subject of this Framework Decision is to implement Article 31(e) TEU, which provides
that common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include adopting
measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and
to penalties in the field of terrorism.
This will help to achieve the Union's objective, expressed in Article 29 TEU, of providing
citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice.
Article 2 (Scope)
Article 2 provides four criteria to limit the scope of this Framework Decision. Apart from the
territoriality principle (the offence is committed or prepared in whole or in part within a
Member State) and active personality principle (the offence is committed by a national of a
Member State or for the benefit of a legal person established in a Member State), offences
also fall under this Framework Decision when they are committed against institutions or
people of a Member State.
Article 3 (Terrorist Offences)
Article 3 provides a broad list of terrorist offences, indicating when they are to be regarded as
terrorist offences and terrorist offences related to terrorist groups. Article 3 puts on the
Member States an obligation to ensure that these offences will be punishable as terrorist
offences.
Paragraph 1 contains a list of the most serious terroristoffences. Many of them will probably
be regulated as common offences in the Member States‘ criminal codes. The Framework
Decision requests that when they are intentionally committed by an individual or a group
against one or more countries, their institutions or people (people refers to all persons,
including minorities), with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying
the political, economic, or social structures of those countries; they must be qualified as
terrorist offences. It is worth mentioning, among them, murder; bodily injuries; kidnapping;
hostage taking; threats; extortion; theft; robbery; fabrication, possession, acquisition,
transport or supply of weapons or explosives; unlawful seizure of or damage to state or
government facilities, means of public transport, infrastructure facilities, places of public use,
and property (both private and public). This could include, for instance, acts of urban
violence.
Although terrorist offences committed by computer or electronic devices are apparently less
violent they can be as threatening as the offences previously mentioned, endangering not only
life, health or safety of people but the environment as well. Their main characteristic is that
their effect is intentionally produced at a distance from the perpetrators, but their
consequences may also be much more far reaching. Therefore, terrorist offences covering the
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release of contaminating substances or causing fires, floods or explosions; interfering with or
disrupting the supply of water, power or other fundamental resource; and interference with an
information system are included under paragraphs 1 (h),(i) and (j).
For the purpose of this Framework Decision, ―means of public transport‖ shall mean all
facilities, conveyances and instrumentalities, whether publicly or privately owned, that are
used in or for publicly available services for the transportation of persons of cargo. This is
also the definition of public transportation system in Article 1(6) of the 1998 UN Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. ―Information system‖ shall mean computers and
electronic communication networks, as well as computer data stored, processed, retrieved or
transmitted by them for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and maintenance.
Finally, paragraphs 1(l) and (m) refer to those terrorist acts committed in relation to terrorist
groups, such as directing, promoting of, supporting of and participating in a terrorist group
which are considered terrorist offences.
Paragraph 2 contains the definition of ―terrorist group‖ as a structured organisation,
established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert to commit the
terrorist offences referred to in paragraph 1 (a) to (k).
The wording of this Article allows Member States decide how to introduce the precise
definition of the offences in order to implement this Framework Decision.
Article 4 (Instigating, aiding, abetting and attempting)
Article 4 puts an obligation on Member States to ensure that instigating, aiding, abetting and
attempting to commit terrorist offences are punishable.
Article 5 (Penalties and sanctions)
Article 5 concerns penalties. Paragraph 1 indicates that the offences and conduct referred to
in Articles 3 and 4 shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.
The scope of the penalties (paragraph 2) is rather broad in view of the different terrorist
offences and penalties for terrorism existing in the Member States. The highest penalty is a
period of deprivation of liberty of no less than twenty years (murder) and the lowest is a
period of no less than two years (extortion, theft, robbery and threatening to commit some
offences). The possibility of imposing ancillary or alternative sanctions such as community
service, limitation of certain civil or political rights or publication of all or part of a sentence
as regards to offences and conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4 is also made available in
paragraph 3.
Paragraph 4 indicates that fines could also be imposed.
Article 6 (Aggravating circumstances)
Article 6 establishes aggravating circumstances in case the offence is committed with
particular ruthlessness, affects a large number of persons or is of a particular serious and
persistent nature, or is committed against Heads of State, Government Ministers, any other
internationally protected person, elected members of parliamentary chambers, members of
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regional or local governments, judges, magistrates, judicial or prison civil servants and police
forces. Internationally protected persons shall have the same meaning as Article 1 of the
1973 Convention on the Prevenetion and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.
Article 7 (Mitigating circumstances)
Article 7, taking into account the Council Resolution of 20 December 1996 on individuals
who cooperate with the judicial process in the fight against international organised crime,18
refers to mitigating circumstances when the offender renounces his or her criminal activity
and provides administrative or judicial authorities with information, helping them to prevent
the effects of the offence in time, so that crime, the planning of which he is aware, may still
be prevented; to identify or to bring to justice other terrorist offenders, to find evidence
concerning terrorist crimes or to prevent further terrorist offences.
Article 8 (Liability of legal persons)
In line with the approach taken in a number of legal instruments adopted at EU level to
combat different types of criminality, it is necessary also to cover the situation in which legal
persons are involved in terrorist offences. Article 8 therefore contains provisions for holding
a legal person liable for the offences or conduct envisaged by Articles 3 and 4, committed for
their benefit by any person with certain leading positions, acting either individually or as a
part of the organ of the legal person. The term liability should be construed so as to include
either criminal or civil liability.
In addition, according to standard practice, paragraph 2 provides that a legal person can also
be held liable when the lack of supervision or control by a person in a position to exercise
control, has rendered possible the commission of the offences for its benefit. Paragraph 3
indicates that legal proceedings against a legal person do not preclude parallel legal
proceedings against a natural person.
Article 9 (Sanctions for legal persons)
Article 9 sets out a requirement for penalties for legal persons held liable for the offences or
conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4. It requires effective, proportionate and dissuasive
penalties, where the minimum obligation is to impose criminal or non-criminal fines. Other
penalties that typically could apply to legal persons are also indicated.
Article 10 (Jurisdiction)
Article 10 contains procedural provisions on jurisdiction.
Paragraph 1 establishes a series of criteria conferring jurisdiction to prosecute and investigate
cases involving the offences or conduct referred to in this Framework Decision. A Member
State shall establish its jurisdiction in four situations:
a)

where the offence is committed in whole or in part on its territory, irrespective of the
status or the nationality of the person involved (territoriality principle),

18
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b)

where the offender is a national of that Member State (active personality principle),

c)

where the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in the
territory of that Member State,

d)

when the offence is committed against its institutions or people.

Given that not all Member States‘ legal traditions recognise extraterritorial jurisdiction for all
types of criminal offences, paragraph 2 allows them not to apply the rules on jurisdiction set
out in paragraph 1 as regards the situations covered by paragraph 1(b), (c) and (d).
Paragraph 3 states that the Member States shall inform the Council‘s General Secretariat
where they decide to apply Paragraph 2.
Article 11 (Extradition and prosecution)
This article shall no longer be applicable as soon as the Commission's proposal for a
European arrest warrant is adopted, which will replace extradition within the EU. In
particular, the European arrest warrant proposal does not foresee that nationality be a ground
for refusal.
Article 11 takes account of the fact that some Member States do not extradite their own
nationals and seeks to ensure that persons suspected of having committed terrorist offences
do not evade prosecution because extradition is refused on the grounds that they are nationals
of that State.
A Member State which does not extradite its own nationals must take the necessary measures
to establish its jurisdiction over and, where appropriate, prosecute the offences concerned
when committed by its own nationals on the territory of another Member State or against
another Member State‘s institutions or people. This article does not regulate relations
between Member States and third countries, which could be dealt with in international
instruments.
Article 12 (Cooperation between Member States)
The purpose of Article 12 is to take advantage of the international instruments on judicial
cooperation to which Member States are parties and which should apply to the matters
covered in this Framework Decision. For instance, arrangements on mutual legal assistance
and extradition are contained in a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as
conventions of the European Union.
Paragraph 1 requires the Member States to lend each other every possible assistance in
matters of judicial and police procedure relating to offences covered by this Framework
Decision. Paragraph 2 states that if several Member States have jurisdiction, they will
consult one another with a view to coordinating action and, where appropriate, to bringing
effective prosecutions. The paragraph also requires full use to be made of existing
cooperation mechanisms, judicial or otherwise, such as Europol, the exchange of liaison
magistrates, the European Judicial Network and the Provisional Judicial Cooperation Unit.
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Article 13 (Exchange of information)
Article 13 (1) stresses the importance of having appointed points of contact for the purpose of
exchanging information between Member States. Paragraph 2 provides for the circulation of
information on which points of contact have been appointed for the purpose of exchanging
information pertaining to these offences.
Paragraph 3 provides for the exchange of information between Member States relating to the
future commission of a terrorist offence to enable the adoption of appropriate measures to
prevent the commission of the offence.
Article 14 (Protection and assistance to victims)
In the European Union's approach against terrorism special importance has been attached to
the protection of and assistance to the victims. A Framework Decision was adopted by the
Council on 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings. In addition,
the Commission is working on a Green Paper concerning compensation to crime victims.
Victims of certain kind of terrorist offences (e.g. threats, extortion) are vulnerable.
Therefore, it is appropriate for each Member State to ensure that investigation or prosecution
not be dependent of the report or accusation made by a person subject to the offence.
Article 15 (Implementation and reports)
Article 15 concerns the implementation and follow-up of this Framework Decision.
Paragraph 1 requires the Member States to take the necessary measures to comply with this
Framework Decision by 31 December 2002.
Paragraph 2 requires the Member States to transmit by that date to the General Secretariat of
the Council and to the Commission the provisions transposing the obligations imposed on
them under this Framework Decision into national law. On that basis the Commission has to
submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the operation of this
Framework Decision. Finally, the Council shall assess the extent to which Member States
have complied with the obligations imposed by the Framework Decision.
Article 16 (Entry into force)
Article 16 provides that this Framework Decision will enter into force on the third day
following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
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2001/0217 (CNS)
Proposal for a
COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION
on combating terrorism

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Union, and in particular Article 29,
Article 31(e) and Article 34(2)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,19
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,20
Whereas:
(1)

Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of the principles of human
dignity, liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and
the rule of law, principles on which the European Union is founded and which are
common to the Member States.

(2)

All or some Member States are party to a number of conventions relating to terrorism.
he European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 21 of 27 January 1977
establishes that terrorist offences cannot be regarded as a political offences or as
offences connected with political offences or as offences inspired by political motives.
That Convention was the subject of Recommendation 1170 (1991) adopted by the
Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe, on 25 November 1991. The United Nations has adopted the Convention
for the suppression of terrorist bombings of 15 December 1997 and the Convention
for the suppression of financing terrorism of 9 December 1999.

(3)

At Union level, on 3 December 1998 the Council adopted the Action Plan of the
Council and the Commission on how to best implement the provisions of the Treaty
of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice22. Terrorism was referred to
in the conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 23,
and of the Santa María da Feira European Council if 19 and 20 June 200024. It was
also mentioned in the Commission‘s Communication to the Council and the European
Parliament on the biannual update of the scoreboard to review progress on the
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creation of an area of "freedom, security and justice" in the European Union (second
half of 15 2000)25. The La Gomera Declaration adopted at the Informal Council
Meeting of 14 October 1995 affirmed that terrorism constitutes a threat to democracy,
to the free exercise of human rights and to economic and social development.
(4)

On 30 July 1996 twenty five measures to fight against terrorism were advocated by
the leading industrialised countries (G7) and Russia meeting in Paris.

(5)

The Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the
establishment of a European Police Office (Europol convention)26 refers in particular
in Article 2 to improving the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent
authorities in the Member States in preventing and combating terrorism.

(6)

Other measures having an impact on terrorism adopted by the European Union are as
follows: the Council Decision of 3 December 1998 instructing Europol to deal with
crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against
the life, limb, personal freedom or property27; Joint Action 96/610/JHA of 15 October
1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union concerning the creation and maintenance of a Directory of specialised
counterterrorist competences, skills and expertise to facilitate counter-terrorismcooperation between the Member States of the European Union28; Joint Action
98/428/JHA of 29 June 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union on the creation of a European Judicial Network29, with
responsibilities in terrorist offences, in particular Article 2; Joint Action 98/733/JHA
of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty
on European Union on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal
organisation in the Member States of the European Union30; and the Council
Recommendation of 9 December 1999 on cooperation in combating the financing of
terrorism31.

(7)

The important work performed by international organisations, in particular the UN
and the Council of Europe, must be complemented with a view to closer
approximation within the European Union. The profound change in the nature of
terrorism, the inadequacy of traditional forms of judicial and police cooperation in
combating it and the existing legal loopholes must be combated with new measures,
namely, establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements and penalties
in the field of terrorism.

(8)

Since these objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States unilaterally, and can therefore, because of the need for reciprocity, be
better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as referred to in Article 2 of the EU

25

COM (2000) 782 final.
OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p.1.
OJ C 26, 30.1.1999, p.22.
OJ L 273, 25.10.1996.
OJ L 191, 7.7.1998, p. 4.
OJ L 351, 29.12.1998, p.1.
OJ C 373, 23.12.1999, p.1.

26
27
28
29
30
31

91

Treaty and as set out in Article 5 of the EC Treaty. In accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in the latter Article, this Framework Decision does not go
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(9)

Measures should be adopted applying not only to terrorist acts committed within the
Member States but also to those which otherwise affect Member States. While police
and judicial cooperation measures are the appropriate way to combat terrorism in the
Union and on an international level, complementary actions may be adopted in order
to enhance the impact in the fight against terrorist acts and ensure consistency of the
Union‘s external relations.

(10)

It is necessary that the definition of the constituent elements of terrorism be common
in all Member States, including those offences referred to terrorist groups. On the
other hand, penalties and sanctions are provided for natural and legal persons having
committed or being liable for such offences, which reflect the seriousness of such
offences.

(11)

The circumstances should be considered aggravated where the offence is committed
with particular ruthlessness, affects a large number of persons or is of a particular
serious and persistent nature; or committed against persons whose representative
position, including internationally protected person, as members of an executive or
legislature or their work, dealing with terrorists, makes them terrorist targets.

(12)

The circumstances must be mitigating if terrorists, renouncing their terrorist activity,
provide the administrative or judicial authorities with some relevant information
helping them to fight against terrorism.

(13)

Jurisdictional rules must be established to ensure that the offence may be prosecuted.

(14)

The European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 is taken into account
in order to facilitate prosecution when the offence is committed in a Member State
which does not extradite its own nationals.

(15)

In order to improve cooperation and in compliance with data protection rules, and in
particular the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data32, Member States
should afford each other the widest judicial mutual assistance. Operational contact
points should be established for the exchange of information or adequate use should
be made of existing cooperation mechanism for that purpose.

(16)

Victims of certain kind of terrorist offences, such as threats, extortion, can be rather
vulnerable. Each Member State should accordingly ensure that investigation or
prosecution not be dependent on the report or accusation made by a person subject to
the offence.

32
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(17)

This Framework Decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
and notably Chapter VI thereof.

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS :
Article 1- Subject matter
The purpose of this Framework Decision is to establish minimum rules relating to the
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties for natural and legal persons who have
committed or are liable for terrorist offences which reflect the seriousness of such offences.
Article 2 – Scope
This Framework Decision shall apply to terrorist offences:
(a)

committed or prepared in whole or in part within a Member State; or

(b)

committed by a national of a Member State; or

(c)

committed for the benefit of a legal person established in a Member State; or

(d)

committed against the institutions or people of a Member State.
Article 3 – Terrorist Offences

1.

Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following
offences, defined according to its national law, which are intentionally committed by
an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people
with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political,
economic, or social structures of a country, will be punishable as terrorist offences:
(a)

Murder;

(b)

Bodily injuries;

(c)

Kidnapping or hostage taking;

(d)

Extortion;

(e)

Theft or robbery;

(f)

Unlawful seizure of or damage to state or government facilities, means of
public transport, infrastructure facilities, places of public use, and property;

(g)

Fabrication, possession, acquisition, transport or supply of weapons or
explosives;

(h)

Releasing contaminating substances, or causing fires, explosions or floods,
endangering people, property, animals or the environment;
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2.

(i)

Interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power, or other fundamental
resource;

(j)

Attacks through interference with an information system;

(k)

Threatening to commit any of the offences listed above;

(l)

Directing a terrorist group;

(m)

Promoting of, supporting of or participating in a terrorist group.

For the purpose of this Framework Decision, terrorist group shall mean a structured
organisation established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in
concert to commit terrorist offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) to (1)(k).
Article 4 - Instigating, aiding, abetting and attempting

Member States shall ensure that instigating, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit a
terrorist offence is punishable.
Article 5 - Penalties and sanctions
1.

Member States shall ensure that terrorist offences and conducts referred to in Articles
3 and 4 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.

2.

Member States shall ensure that terrorist offences referred to in Article 3 are
punishable by terms of deprivation of liberty with a maximum penalty that is no less
than the following:

3.

(a)

the offence referred to in Article 3(1)(a): Twenty years

(b)

the offence referred to in Article 3(1)(l): Fifteen years

(c)

the offences referred to in Article 3(1)(c), (g), (h) and (i): Ten years

(d)

the offence referred to in Article 3(1)(m): Seven years

(e)

the offences referred to in Article 3(1) (f)and (j): Five years

(f)

the offence referred to in Article 3(1)(b): Four years

(g)

the offences referred to in Article 3(1)(d), (e), and (k) : Two years.

Member States shall ensure that ancillary or alternative sanctions such as community
service, limitation of certain civil or political rights or publication of all or part of a
sentence may be imposed for terrorist offences and conduct referred to in Articles 3
and 4.
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4.

Member States shall ensure that fines can also be imposed for terrorist offences and
conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4.
Article 6 - Aggravating circumstances

Without prejudice to any other aggravating circumstances defined in their national
legislation, Member States shall ensure that the penalties and sanctions referred to in Article
5 may be increased if the terrorist offence:
(a)

is committed with particular ruthlessness; or

(b)

affects a large number of persons or is of a particular serious and persistent nature; or

(c)

is committed against Heads of State, Government Ministers, any other internationally
protected person, elected members of parliamentary chambers, members of regional
or local governments, judges, magistrates, judicial or prison civil servants and police
forces.
Article 7 - Mitigating Circumstances

Member States shall ensure that the penalties and sanctions referred to in Article 5 may be
reduced if the offender:
(a)

renounces terrorist activity, and

(b)

provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information helping them to:
(i)

prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence,

(ii)

identify or bring to justice the other offenders,

(iii)

find evidence, or

(iv)

prevent further terrorist offences.
Article 8 - Liability of legal persons

1.

2.

Member States shall ensure that legal persons can be held liable for terrorist offences
or conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4 committed for their benefit by any person,
acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading
position within the legal person, based on:
(a)

a power of representation of the legal person, or

(b)

an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person, or

(c)

an authority to exercise control within the legal person.

Apart from the cases provided for in paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that a
legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a person
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referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of terrorist offences or
conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4 for the benefit of that legal person by a person
under its authority.
3.

Liability of a legal person under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal
proceedings against natural persons who committerrorist offences or engage in the
conducts referred to in Articles 3 and 4.
Article 9 – Sanctions for legal persons

1.

2.

Member States shall ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to Article 8(1) is
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which shall include
criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other sanctions such as:
(a)

exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid,

(b)

temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial
activities,

(c)

placing under judicial supervision,

(d)

a judicial winding-up order,

(e)

temporary or permanent closure of establishment which have been used for
committing the offence.

Member States shall ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to Article 8(2) is
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions or measures.
Article 10 - Jurisdiction

1.

Member States shall establish its jurisdiction with regard to terrorist offences or
conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4 where the offence or conduct has been
committed:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

in whole or in part within its territory; or
by one of its nationals, provided that the law of that Member State may require
the conduct to be punishable also in the country where it occurred; or
for the benefit of a legal person that has its head office in the territory of that
Member State; or
against its institutions or people.

2.

A Member State may decide that it will not apply, or that it will apply only in specific
cases or circumstances, a jurisdiction rule set out in paragraph 1(b), (c) or (d).

3.

Member States shall inform the General Secretariat of the Council and the
Commission accordingly, where appropriate with an indication of the specific cases or
circumstances in which the decision applies.
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Article 11 - Extradition and prosecution
1.

A Member State which, under its law, does not extradite its own nationals shall
establish its jurisdiction over terrorist offences or conduct referred to in Articles 3 and
4 when committed by its own nationals on the territory of another Member State or
against another Member State‘s institutions or people.

2.

A Member State shall, when one of its nationals is alleged to have committed, in
another Member State, an terrorist offence or conduct referred to in Articles 3 and 4,
and it does not extradite that person to that other Member State solely on the ground
of his nationality, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution if appropriate.
In order to enable prosecution to take place, the Member State in which the offence or
conduct was committed shall forward to the competent authorities of the other State
all the relevant files, information and exhibits in accordance with the procedures laid
down in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December
1957. The requesting Member State shall be informed of the initiation and outcome of
any prosecution.

3.

For the purpose of this Article, a "national" of a Member State shall be construed in
accordance with any declaration made by that State under Article 6(1)(b) and (c) of
the European Convention on Extradition.
Article 12 - Cooperation between Member States

1.

In accordance with the applicable conventions, multilateral or bilateral agreements or
arrangements, Member States shall afford each other the widest measure of mutual
assistance in respect of proceedings relating to terrorist offences or conduct referred to
in Articles 3 and 4.

2.

Where several Member States have jurisdiction in respect of such offences, they shall
consult one another with a view to coordinating their action in order to prosecute
effectively. They shall make full use of judicial cooperation and other mechanisms.
Article 13 - Exchange of information

1.

Each Member State shall designate operational contact points, which may be an
existing operational structures or one newly established for this purpose, for the
exchange of information and for other contacts between Member States for the
purposes of applying this Framework Decision.

2.

Each Member State shall inform the General Secretariat of the Council and the
Commission of its operational contact point as referred to in paragraph 1. The General
Secretariat shall notify that information to the other Member States.

3.

Where a Member State has information relating to the future commission of a terrorist
offence affecting another Member State, it shall provide that information to the other
Member State. For that purpose operational contact points referred to in paragraph 1
may be used.
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Article 14 - Protection and assistance to victims
Each Member State shall provide that investigations into or prosecution of terrorist offences
over which it has jurisdiction shall not be dependent on the report or accusation made by a
victim of the offence, at least in cases where Article 8(1)(a) applies.
Article 15 - Implementation and reports
Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this Framework Decision by
31 December 2002.
They shall communicate to the General Secretariat of the Council and to the Commission the
text of any provisions they adopt and information on any other measures they take to comply
with this Framework Decision.
On that basis the Commission shall, by 31 December 2003, submit a report to the European
Parliament and to the Council on the operation of this Framework Decision, accompanied
where necessary by legislative proposals.
The Council shall assess the extent to which the Member States have complied with this
Framework Decision.
Article 16 - Entry into force
This Framework Decision shall enter into force on the third day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Done at Brussels,

For the Council
The President
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